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O'Brien: The 1983 Amendments to SEC Rule 14A-8: Upsetting a Precarious Ba

THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO SEC RULE 14a-8:
UPSETTING A PRECARIOUS BALANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The central purpose of the federal securities laws, which apply
to publicly-held corporations, is disclosure.' The rationale for disclosure
is to provide shareholders with sufficient information to make
intelligent decisions and to apprise them of significant developments
within the company.! Consistent with this goal, the shareholder
proposal rule' aids the shareholder as a voter by enlarging the scope
of information he receives, by permitting him to propose policy questions for the benefit of fellow shareholders, and by allowing him to
vote on questions proposed by other shareholders.'
Due to the size and dispersion of the shareholder body in large
publicly-held companies, a surrogate mechanism is necessary to allow
shareholders to be represented at the annual shareholders' meeting.'
It is simply not practical for all or even a majority of the shareholders
to be present at the annual meeting to vote on matters of corporate
concern.6 Allowing shareholders to vote by proxy alleviates this
problem. A proxy is nothing more than an agency relationship created
when a shareholder authorizes the holder of his proxy to cast his vote

1. Cohen, The SEC and Proxy Contests, 20 FED. B. J. 91,94 (1960); Loomis, The
SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 214 (1959).

2. Von Mehren & McCarrol, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in Administrative
Process, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 728, 730 (1964).
3. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8 (1984). Reprinted in appendix. The shareholder proposal
rule, commonly referred to as the "shareholder bill of rights," requires management to
include in its proxy statement a proposal submitted by a stockholder if the proposal is
a proper subject for action by the shareholder. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN. PROXY CONTESTS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 281 (2d Ed. 1968). By means of this rule, the shareholder has the
opportunity, at almost no cost to himself, to reach the great majority of shareholders in
larger public corporations who choose to vote by proxy rather than attend the stockholders
meetings. Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of ShareholderProposals,84 HARV. L. REV.
700 (19711.
4. Latcham & Emerson, Proxy Contest Expenses and ShareholderDemocracy,
4 CASE W. RES. 5, 9 (1952).
5. Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule,
65 GEO. L.J. 635 (1977).
6. L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, D. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS 461 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as SOLOMON]
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at the annual meeting.7 The proxy rules promulgated by the Securities
Exchange Commission8 (Commission) under section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934? are primarily concerned with how this agency
relationship is created and what facts the shareholder must be given
by those seeking his proxy so that he may have sufficient information for an intelligent vote." Indeed, the major premise of the
shareholder proposal rule is that, to achieve true corporate democracy,
the issuer's materials should be as much a forum for proper
shareholder proposals as it is for management's proposals." Under
Rule 14a-8 a shareholder can, subject to certain limitations, submit
a proposal for inclusion in the corporate proxy material which will
later be voted on by fellow shareholders.
Congress created the Commission, in part, to prevent the recurrence of abuses which frustrated the shareholders' free exercise of
voting rights and to insure "fair corporate suffrage."" The Commission's Proxy Review Program strives to further this goal." Consistent with this broad goal, the Proxy Review Program seeks to reduce
disclosure costs, streamline the proxy rules, and improve proxy
readability. 4 However, accomplishing these objectives while insuring
7.

Von Mehren & McCarrol, supra note 2, at 729. Under the common law,

shareholders were largely prohibited from voting by proxy unless permitted in the corporation's articles or by-laws. However, today all corporate statutes permit shareholders
to vote by proxy, even in the absence of an article or by-law amendment. See generally,
M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION - A LEGAL ANALYSIS 99 (1976).
8. The Securities and Exchange Commission has the responsibility of administering and enforcing the federal securities laws. It is an independent regulatory agency consisting of five members appointed for staggered five year terms by the President with
the concurrence of the Senate. H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1984 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 1
(1984).
9. 15 U.S.C. S 78a-78 KK (1976).
10. Von Mehren & McCarrol, supra note 2, at 729.
11. Heler, Stockholder Proposals,4 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMPILATION 70 (1953).
12. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every
equity security bought on a public exchange. Management of properties
owned by the investing public should not be permitted to perpetuate
themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies. Insiders having little or no
substantial interest in the properties they manage have often retained their
control without an adequate disclosure of their interests and without an
adequate explanation of the management policies they intended to pursue.
Id. See Securities Exchange Act 1934, 5 14(a), 15 U.S.C. S 78 n(a) (1976).
13. The Commission's Proxy Review Program is designed to reduce the burdens
of compliance with the Commission's proxy rules consistent with investor protection.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-19135 (Oct. 12, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 27420
(1982), 26 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 494 (1982). [hereinafter cited as SEC DOCKET].
14. Id at 496. See also Karmel, Proxy Review Program Designed to Ease
Burdens, SEC '83 9 (1982).
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that Rule 14a-8 continues to serve fairly both the issuers and the
shareholders is no easy task.
The Commission must seek an appropriate balance between providing shareholders with reasonable access to the issuer's proxy
machinery and protecting issuers from abuses resulting from
shareholder access. 5 Not surprisingly, issuers have generally advocated
limiting shareholder access to corporate proxy materials.' In contrast,
shareholders frequently contend that the shareholder proposal rule
is the only device they can employ to influence corporate decisions."'
Many shareholders believe that Rule 14a-8 improves the relationship
8
between management and shareholders.
Issuers and some commentators frequently express their concern
9
that the shareholder proposal rule serves no useful purpose. A common misconception held by them is that shareholder proposals are
merely safety valves through which irate shareholders express their
concerns. 0 In reality, however, many shareholders use proposals as
a device for funnelling new information and injecting new perspectives into the corporation, often subtly affecting company decisions."
Today, the shareholder is more literate and perceptive than even the
most visionary proponent of the original shareholder proposal rule
could have predicted.' Therefore, management's traditional argument
15. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 638.
16. Lydenberg, HighNoonfor Social Proxy Activists, 46 Bus. Soc'y. REV. 62 (1983).
17. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 635. Absent the shareholder proposal
rule all corporate media are solely in the hands of management. Thus, "[w]ithout the benefit
of this rule, a shareholder who is dissatisfied with his company's behavior and is without
sufficient funds to solicit proxies, will find effective communication with his fellow
shareholders impossible." Schulman, ShareholderCauseProposals:A Technique to Catch
the Conscience of the Corporation,40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 41 (1971).
18. Propp, The SEC's Shareholder ProposalRule: CorporateAcountability at
the Crossroads, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 133 (1983).
19. Division of Corporation Finance, Summary of Comments: ShareholderProposalRelease 15 (1983) (available in Valparaiso University Law School Library) [hereinafter
cited as Summary of Comments].
20. Propp, supra. note 18, at 128.
21. Id. at 99. Under Rule 14a-8, the Commission, through the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance, functions as an intermediary between proponents and issuers.
Expeditious scrutiny of proposals is facilitated by referral of the material to the staff
members. Consequently, "[t]he role of the Commission approaches more nearly that of
an umpire fixing the rules, detecting the infraction, and applying the remedy whether
it be correction by retraction or explanation or by process of the court." Cohen, supra
note 1, at 102.
22. Latcham & Emerson, supra note 4. at 8. In fact, "much evidence is at hand
that the stockholder along with his fellow members of the general public are being educated
and experiencing an awakening of the breadth of his intellectual capacities for corporate
as well as general understanding." Id.
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that shareholder input need only be sought for fundamental economic
decisions is no longer valid. Unfortunately, some issuers feel that this
increasingly sophisticated class of investors is currently abusing the
shareholder proposal system. 23
In an apparent attempt to respond to criticism that shareholder
proponents are currently abusing the shareholder proposal process,
the Commission recently revised Rule 14a-8.24 The revisions adopted
by the Commission are significant and evidence an intent to tighten
up the provisions of the shareholder proposal rule. 2 In particular, the
recent amendments attempt to eliminate the alleged abuse by
"sophisticated investors" by placing arbitrary barriers before
shareholders seeking access to the corporate proxy machinery. 26 This
practice of arbitrarily restricting shareholder access to the proxy
machinery, coupled with management's relatively unfettered access
to that machinery, only perpetuates the legal separation of ownership from control." In the words of a current commissioner, "[i]f we
are going to support shareholder access in theory, we should support
it in practice as well, and not just for highly sophisticated investors
who can afford to develop or retain the skills necessary to master
the labyrinth that Rule 14a-8 sets before them."' Hence, if the
shareholder proposal process is to work effectively, the Commission
must be careful to assure that it is operated in a balanced, neutral
manner.
This note examines the current revisions adopted by the Commission to Rule 14a-8 as well as the legislative policy that the
shareholder proposal rule was initially designed to embody. This
legislative policy is examined in light of the legislative history and
early Commission interpretation of case law. This note then explores
the reasons why the present revisions, taken collectively, fail
adequately to serve that policy. Finally, this note suggests some revisions, workable within the previous framework of Rule 14a-8, which
will comport with both the goals of the Proxy Review Program and
the original legislative policy.
23. See generally, Summary of Comments, supra note 19.
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-20091 (Oct. 13, 1983), 47
Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1983) (Longstreth, Comm., Dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Release
No. 34-20091].
25. Lydenberg, supra note 16, at 64.
26. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 8. See infra notes 263-448 and accompanying text.
27. Elliot, The Remarriage of Corporate Oumership and Management Account-

ability, 3 U.
28.

BRIDGEPORT L. REV.

49 (1981).

Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 8.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND UNDERLYING RATIONALES OF
RULE 14a-8
Rule 14a-8, 2 the shareholder proposal rule, is one of the most
widely known rules administered by a federal agency." The rule permits any shareholder who complies with its provisions, and whose purpose does not fall within the categories which may be omitted from
an issuer's proxy material, to propose action to be voted on by his
fellow shareholders."1 However, "[t]he right of a shareholder to have
his proposal included in the issuer's proxy material is less than
absolute."' The question of whether a proposal is a proper subject
for inclusion in the proxy statement has plagued the Commission for
many years.' To fully appreciate the significance of the present revisions to Rule 14a-8 one must examine the evolution of the shareholder
proposal rule.
Section 14(a)14 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 5 empowers
the Commission to regulate the solicitation of proxies" from holders
29. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8 (1984) Reprinted in appendix.
30. Black & Sparks, The SEC as Referee - Shareholder Proposals and Rule
14a-8, 2 J. CORP. LAW 1 (1976).
31. Id. at 2.
32. Comment, SEC ShareholderProposalRule 14a-8: Impact of the 1972 Amendments, 61 GEo. L.J. 781, 782 (1973). Under state law, shareholders have never been
granted the right to have a proposal included in the corporate proxy materials even
though the proposal might properly be considered at the annual meeting. The Commission affords shareholders an opportunity, not available at state law, for participation in corporate affairs. Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals,
84 HARV. L. REv.700, 703 (1971).
33. Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on CampaignGM,
69 MICH. L. REv. 421, 436 (1971).
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 14(a), 15 U.S.C. S 78 n(a) (1976).
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, by use of mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national
securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the
use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security other than an exempted security.
Id.
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 5 78a-78KK (1976). Congress
authorized the creation of the Commission to prevent the recurrence of abuses which have
frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
36. The term "proxy" includes every proxy, consent or authorization within the
meaning of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The consent or authorization may, however, take the form of failure to object or dissent. R. HAMILTON, CORPORA.
TIONS 528 (2d Ed. 1981).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 9

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

of securities registered on national securities exchanges. 7 Congress
provided the Commission with broad authority- to adopt rules
regulating the solicitation of proxies in order to promote "fair corporate suffrage. '"" In 1935, the Commission adopted its first set of
rules known as the "L.A. Rules."4 After three proxy seasons"' the
Commission formulated a comprehensive set of rules denominated
Regulation X-14.42 This regulation included a general anti-fraud provision which stated that if management was aware of any action proposed to be taken at the annual corporate meeting pertaining to any

37. Heller, supra note 11, at 72. Section 14 is applicable to all securities registered
in accordance with S 12, 15 U.S.C. S 78 L (1976). Under S 12(g) (1-2), all companies whose
stock is traded on a national exchange, or that have assets in excess of $3 million and
more than 300 shareholders of record, are subject to the periodic reporting and proxy
regulations of S 14.17 C.F.R. S 240.12g 1-2 (1984). However, the Commission has expressly
removed certain solicitations from the ambit of proxy regulations. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-2
(1984).
38. Section 14(a) authorizes the Commission to adopt rules "... as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors..... 15 U.S.C.
S 78 N (a) (1976). "Thus in effect Congress left the entire problem of the nature, extent and form of the federal proxy regulation for the SEC to consider and solve, and
the proxy rules as they have evolved since 1934, represent the SEC's exercise of
delegated power." Von Mehren & McCarrol, supra note 2, at 729.
39. See supra note 12.
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be
enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also
to the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholder meetings.
Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the stockholder of the
real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought.
S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 378 (Class A) (July 8, 1942), 7
Fed. Reg. 5209 (1942). The "L.A. Rules" required the issuance of a proxy statement containing a "brief description" of the matters to be considered at the stockholders' meeting.
Further, it prohibited false or misleading statements, required the filing of proxy materials
at the time they were mailed to the stockholders, and required management to mail out
proxy materials submitted by stockholders. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at
92. Essentially, the rules were nothing more than a set of principles which permitted the
Commission to control the most blatant abuses while studying further the needs and requirements of the problems which Congress had given to them. Von Mehren & McCarrol,
supra note 2, at 736.
41. The proxy season is the first three or four months of the new year, when
.companies operating on a calendar basis hold their annual meeting. During this time, the
Commission receives a good portion of correspondence dealing with shareholder proposals. Dean, Non-Compliance With.Proxy Regulations: Effect on Ability of a Corporation to Hold Valid Meeting, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 483, 493 (1939).
42. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 1823 (Aug. 11, 1938), 3 Fed. Reg.
1991 (1983). See generally, Note, ShareholderProposals:The Experiene of Rule 14a-8, 59
GEO. L.J. 1343, 1344-45 (1971).
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matter not otherwise disclosed, it would be obligated to describe
briefly the substance of each matter in its communications to
shareholders. 3 However, the Commission had yet to promulgate a
specific shareholder proposal rule.
In 1942, the Commission promulgated the first rule regulating
shareholder proposals." The rule, known as X-14a-7, required management to include in the proxy statement any shareholder proposal which
was a "proper subject" for action by security holders."5 In the Commission's view, the term "proper subject" would be interpreted
according to the laws of the issuer's domicile." The "state law standard" required the Commission to study the statutory and decisional

43. This provision stated:
No solicitation subject to Section 14(a) of the act shall be made by means
of any form of proxy, notice of meeting, or other communication containing
any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.
Rule X-14 a-5, Release No. 1823, supra note 42. The Commission first stated in 1939, and
continues to believe, that a proxy statement which fails to disclose all matters which
management believes will properly be put before shareholders as well as how management intends to vote the proxies which it solicits, is misleading. Hearingon SEC Proxy
Ruies Before the House Committee on Interstateand ForeignCommerce,78th Cong., 1st Sess.
169-70 (1943).
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18,1942),7 Fed. Reg.
10,653 (1942). At the hearings before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Chairman Purcell explained an underlying reality that prompted adoption of the
rule:
Once a shareholder could address a meeting, today he can only address the
assembled proxies which are lying at the head of the table. The only opportunity that the stockholder has of expressing his judgment comes at the time
when he considers the execution of the proxy form, and we believe, whether
we are right and whether we are wrong - and I think we are right - that
that is the time he should have the full information before him and the ability
to take action as he sees fit.
The proxy solicitation is now in fact the only means by which a stockholder
can act and can perform the functions which are his as owner of the corporation. It, therefore, seems clear to us that only by making the proxy
a real instrument for the exercise of those functions can we obtain what
the Congress and this committee called for in the form of "fair corporate
suffrage."
Hearingson H.R. 1498, H.R. 1821, andH.R. 2019, Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 174-75 (1943).
45. Id.
46. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638 (Jan. 3, 1945), 11 Fed. Reg.
10,995 (1946). The Director of the Division of Corporate Finance issued an opinion statingSpeaking generally, it is the purpose of rule X-14 a-7 to place stockholders

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 9

228

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.19

law of the state of incorporation and discover each state's
1 However, the lack of case law on shareholder
interpretation."
authority
forced the Commission to rely heavily on state corporation statutes."8
Unfortunately, most state corporation statutes contained only broad
and cryptic language with respect to the duties of the board of
directors." The consequence of relying on state law to determine the
scope of the federal remedy created many problems and was soon
challenged. 0
The first important corporate challenge to the Commission's
power over the proxy solicitation process occurred in 1947.1 In SEC
in the position to bring before their fellow stockholders matters of concern

to them as stockholders in such corporation; that is,
such matters relating
to the affairs of the company concerned as are proper subjects of stockholders'
action under the laws of the state under which it was organized. It was not
the intent of rule X-14 a-7 to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus
of other stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general political,
social or economic nature. In short, rule X-14 a-7 should operate so as to leave
intact the primary substantive regulation which state law seeks to achieve.
Id.
47. Id. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 654.
48. The purpose of the relevant state statutory provisions was merely to empower
proxy voting, not to regulate its mechanics. While the proxy system grew in significance
and complexity, the corporation statutes failed to adequately regulate the solicitation of
proxies. Indeed, the presence of the proxy rules issued by the Commission and its central
administrative mechanism for enforcing them may account in part for the inaction of state
legislatures in this area. Eisenberg, Access to CorporateProxy Machinery,83 HARV. L. REv.
1492-93 (1970).
49. Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states: "[tihe business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter
or in its certificate of incorporation ...." DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8 S 141(a) (Supp. 1980).
The principal draftsman of the Delaware Incorporation Statute, Professor Ernest L.
Folk, has observed that in Delaware the corporation "enjoys the broadest grant of
power in the English-speaking world to establish the most appropriate internal organization and structure for the enterprise." E. FOLK, AMENDMENTS TO THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 5 (1969).
50. Interpretation of state law would seem to place the SEC in much
the same position as the federal courts in the latter's application of the
Erie Doctrine. Because there are few decisions on shareholders' authority under state law, the only guidelines available are the corporation
statutes which normally contain very broad language with respect to the
roles of directors and shareholders. The North Carolina statute, though
broad, is considerably more explicit than most: "Any matter relating to
the affairs of a corporation is a proper subject for action at an annual
meeting of shareholders."
N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-61 (d) (1982). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 S 141(a) (Supp. 1980). See
Note, supra note 42, at 1347.
51. Note, PermissibleScope ofStockholder ProposalsUnderSEC Proxy Rules, 57
YALE L.J. 874 (1948).
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v. Transamerica,a conflict arose between a corporate by-law and the
Commission's shareholder proposal rule. 2 The corporate by-law gave
management virtually unlimited power to omit shareholder proposals
submitted in the form of a by-law amendment unless proper notice
was given.- The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that
a "proper subject" should be determined by reference to state corporation statutes instead of corporate by-laws.- The court endorsed
the notion that the power conferred upon the Commission by Congress cannot be frustrated by procedural devices valid under state
law for other purposes." However, applicable state corporation law,
recognized as the appropriate guide for shareholder resolutions, offered
little guidance.
The Commission then developed a federal common law as a
substitute for state law guidance." The Commission assumed an
interpretive role in the absence of state law; 7 although the Commission was mindful of the necessity to avoid stripping the board of directors of its basic governing function.' The shareholder proposal rule,
though, still did not specify any particular circumstances under which
management could properly omit a shareholder proposal.
Following the Transamerica decision, the Commission began to
define and limit the parameters of what is a proper subject under
the shareholder proposal rule.59 The Commission perceived that some

52. 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948). A shareholder
informed management of his intention to submit four proposals for inclusion in the corporate proxy material. Management attempted to exclude the proposals claiming that
the shareholder failed to comply with notice provisions in the company by-laws. The Commission sued to enjoin the proxy solicitation, arguing that Transamerica was not entitled
to use its notice by-law "as a block or strainer to prevent any proposal to amend the bylaws, which it may deem unsuitable, from reaching a vote at the annual meeting of
stockholders." Id. at 515. The court held that the proposals were proper subjects under
Delaware's general corporation laws. Id. at 518.
53. Id. at 514.
54. Id. at 517.
55. Id. at 518. The court then added that it would not permit a notice by-law
to eviscerate the SEC's proxy rules:
If this minor provision may be employed as Transamerica seeks to employ
it, it will serve to circumvent the intent of Congress in enacting the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. It was the intent of Congress to require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage. This control of great corporations by a very few persons was the abuse at which Congress struck in enacting Section 14(a).
Id.
56. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 440.
57. Propp, supra note 18, at 104.
58. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 440.
59. In adopting the 1948 release, the Commission indicated for the first time that
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shareholder proponents were abusing the shareholder proposal
process.6 In 1948, the Commission amended the shareholder proposal
rule."1 The amendment allowed an issuer to omit proposals submitted
"primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or redressing a personal grievance."' This attitude was the Commission's
underlying rationale in a no-action letter issued by the staff in 1951.3
In Greyhound v. Peck" a federal district court upheld the staffs
no-action determination s The court, relying on a previous Commission release, 6 concurred with both the staff and management that a
under certain circumstances a proposal relating to a matter which was a "proper subject" under state law could nevertheless be omitted from the proxy statement. Schwartz
& Weiss, supra note 5, at 655.
60. Ledes, A Review of-ProperSubject Under the Proxy Rules, 34 U. DEw. L. REv.
520, 522 (1957). The Commission changed the rule in order to prevent abuses of Rule 14a-8
by persons seeking personal ends to the detriment of the security holders. Id.
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4185 (July 6, 1948), 13 Fed.
Reg. 3973 (1948).
62. The Commission's release announcing the adoption of the amendment
explained:
This rule requires management to include in its proxy material, proposals
reasonably submitted by security holders which are proper subjects for action
by security holders. The Commission has found that in a few cases security
holders have abused this privilege by using the rule to achieve personal ends
which are not necessarily in the common interests of the issuer's security
holders generally.
Id. Additional criteria under which management could properly omit proposals were
included in the amendment. They were:
1.) If management had included a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement in the previous two years and the shareholder without good cause failed
to attend the annual meeting to present the proposal; 2.) if substantially the
same proposal had been presented at the last annual or special meeting and
had failed to receive 3% of the total number of votes cast.
Id. Finally, this amendment required management, in order to omit a proposal, to submit
its reasons to the Commission and notify the shareholder at the same time. Ledes, supra
note 60, at 522.
63. Letter to Greyhound, dated March 8, 1951. In a no-action letter, the staff
essentially states that it will not recommend that the Commission take action if the
shareholder proposal is omitted from the corporate proxy material. The staff will ordinarily
advise both the issuer and the proponent of the staff's view concerning management's
position with respect to a proposal. However, there is no requirement that the issuer or
the proponent adhere to the conclusion expressed by the staff. In addition, no-action letters
lack any precedential value.
64. 97 F. Supp. 679 (S-D.N.Y. 1951). The shareholder proponent, owner of three
shares of stock, requested that there be included in Greyhound's proxy material the following
proposal: "[a] recommendation that management consider the advisability of abolishing
the segregated seating system in the south." Id. at 680.
65. Id.
66. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4775 (Dec. 11, 1952), 17 Fed. Reg. 11,431
(1952). The amendment also required that stockholder proposals be submitted thirty days
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shareholder proposal of a general, political, social, or economic nature
was properly excludable from Greyhound's corporate proxy material.
The court held that much deference will be given a staff determination because of the staffs expertise in the securities area." In
Greyhound, the court noted that other forums existed for the presentation of such views. 9 As a result, much impetus existed for codifying such an exclusion.
Primarily as a result of Greyhound, the Commission in 1952
revised the shareholder proposal rule. 0 Issuers could now omit proposals submitted, "primarily for the purpose of promoting general
before the time of the previous year's proxy solicitation instead of thirty days before the
time of the last meeting. In addition, there was a change in the description of the 100
word supporting statement to the effect that the statement need only be in support of
the proposal, and not necessarily contain specific reasons in support of the proposal. Id.
67. 97 F.Supp. at 680.
68. Rules and regulations adopted by the administrative agencies pursuant
to Congressional authorization are best interpreted, in the first instance, by
the agency which has been entrusted with the power and authority to right
them.... This court cannot hold, on the proof before it, unaided as it is by
the vast experience of daily contact with the practical working of this rule
(which the Commission has had) that the interpretation should be set
aside ....

Id- at 681. This statement implies that the administrative rather than the legal expertise
should be the controlling factor in the construction and interpretation of the shareholder
proposal rule. Note, supranote 42, at 1343. The considerable respect paid to a Commission
determination may be the logical result of the manner in which the issues are brought
before the court when a plaintiff shareholder seeks to enjoin company action. The court,
presented only with the argumentative briefs prepared by opposing counsel, and with
no possibility of remanding the case to the agency, may be justifiably reluctant to disturb
the Commission's ruling. Id. In Dyer v. SEC. 287 F.2d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1961), the court
pointed out that:
The Commission's judgment as to necessity or appropriateness is ...

not

subject to being judicially scrutinized as a matter of doubt or mere disagreement as to the wisdom of the Commission's actions, but only as a matter of
utter lack of any possible rational basis, or of legal arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or other administrative irresponsibility having been controlling thereof.
69. The court in Greyhound stated that, "[ilt was not the intent of Rule X-14 a-7
(Now Rule X-14 a-8) to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockholders
with respect to matters which are of a general political, social, or economic nature. Other
forums exist for the presentation of such views." 97 F. Supp. at 680.
70. Release No. 4775, supra note 66. Procedurally, the shareholder proposal rule
now provided for: a conclusive presumption of timeliness for any proposal submitted sixty
days prior to the release of the proxy material for the last annual meeting; a twenty day
notice requirement to shareholders and to the Commission if management intended to
omit a proposal; and a 3-6-10 percent resubmission progression that would allow proposals
that did not obtain the requisite percentage of votes to be omitted after a number of
unsuccessful submissions. For an analysis of the practical consequences of these
requirements, see generally, E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3.
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economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes."'" The "for
the purpose of" language suggested that an examination was required
not only of the substance of the proposal, but also of the shareholder's
motive.72 One major shortcoming of the 1952 amendments adopted by
the Commission was that they offered little help to issuers receiving
proposals dealing with issues entirely within the province of
management.
In an attempt to provide additional guidance in dealing with
shareholder proposals, the Commission again amended Rule 14a-8 in
1954.11 One of the Commission's chief concerns was to relieve management of the necessity of including in its corporate proxy material
shareholder proposals relating to matters falling within the province
of management. 71 Also, the Commission sought to alleviate the
apparent confusion of many issuers resulting from the holding in
Transamerica.71 The changes adopted allowed issuers to omit
71. Release No. 4775, supra note 66.
72. Serious questions are raised as to whether the Commission is capable of determining motivation, let alone the right of a proponent to respond to management's assertions about his motivation. When this is coupled with the staffs limited expertise in this
area, an inquiry into motivation appears to be a dubious activity at best. Comment, supra
note 32, at 781.
73. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4979 (Jan. 6,1954), 19 Fed. Reg.
246 (1954).
74. Id. See also Schwartz, supra note 33, at 433. The American Society of Corporate Secretaries had prepared a report titled History and Operationsof Securities &
Exchange Commission Rule Governing Proposalsby Stockholders which stated that "the
proposal rule was disrupting the organization of American business, wasting the time
of its executives, preventing the annual meeting from accomplishing its normal objective, and putting corporations to an intolerable waste of time and money by forcing them
to include in their proxy statements the proposals of shareholders." L. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS
AND DEMOCRACY 104 (1956).
75. The view of the Commission is indicated in the following quote:
The present rule [prior to 1954 amendment] provides for submission of proposals which are proper subjects for action by security holders but does not
specifically provide that state law is the standard for determining what is
a proper subject for such action. In a prior release, the Commission has so
stated. (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638 January 3,1945). To clarify
this point, the amended rule specifically provides that a security holder's
proposal may be omitted from the management's proxy material if it is one
which, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, is not a proper subject for
action by security holders.
Release No. 4979, supra note 73. "The amended rule specifically provides that state law
is to be the standard of eligibility of a proposal under the rule. The Commission wishes
to make it clear that it considers this standard consistent with the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the case of SEC v. Transamerica Corporation .. " Id. The Commission
accomplished this result in the 1954 Amendment essentially codifying the administrative
policies since 1942, that a proper subject for security holder action under the applicable
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shareholder proposals which were related to "ordinary business
operations.""6 Moreover, the exact parameters of the "ordinary
business operations" exclusion would now be determined under the
laws of the issuer's domicile.7 The Commission observed that the
phrase "ordinary business operations" refers to the area or scope of
activities and not the significance or importance of such activities. 8
The amendment was especially significant to shareholder proponents

because it placed the burden on the issuer to substantiate that a proposal could be omitted under Rule 14a-8. 7' The 1954 amendments to
Rule 14a-8 provided significant guidance and proved highly effective
for a number of years.

The second important challenge to the Commission's power over
the proxy solicitation process occurred during the 1960's when

shareholder activists pressured the Commission to permit the proxy
machinery to be used for social reform.' Advocates of social reform

who had previously made the corporation a target of their discontent
over social conditions tried instead to use the corporation as a vehicle

for social reform.' In attempting to respond to the many no-action
requests," the staff experienced continuing problems with the "for the
purpose of" language common to both the "personal grievance" and

"social causes" exclusions.' The staff decisions ultimately turned on

ascertaining the motive of the shareholder proponent for submitting

the proposal;" "[i]n spite of strong reasons not to do so - history,
state law is only one consideration as to whether a proposal may be included. Ledes, supra
note 60, at 524.
76. Release No. 4979, supra note 73.
77. Hearings on a Report from the SEC on its Problems in Enforcing the
Securities Laws Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 118 (1957).
78. Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule: A Decade Later, 40
NOTRE DAME LAW 36 (1964).
79. The rule places the burden on management to show that a particular
security holder's proposal is not a proper one for inclusion in management's proxy material. Where management contends that a proposal may
be omitted because it is not proper under state law, it will be incumbent
upon management to refer to the applicable statute or case law and furnish a supporting opinion of counsel.
Release No. 4979, supra note 73.
80. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG.,
2D SEss., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNT.
ABILITY, B 151 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
81. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 421.
82. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 149. See supra note 63.
83. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 149.
84. Id. As a result, "[n]ot only would 'motive' have to be divined without the
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policy, and inexperience in related areas - the SEC has tended to
interpret the subparagraphs to require an examination of the proponent's motive.""*The Commission continued to focus on problems connected with shareholder proposals concerning public policy issues.
In 1970, a group known as "Campaign GM"'M attempted to obtain
shareholder approval of several social resolutions through the solicitation of proxies."7 The staff held that all but two resolutions could be
omitted from the corporate proxy materials." While the two proposals
were motivated by social concerns, they were also valid corporate concerns for shareholders.89 The other proposals were disallowed on the
grounds that they related to "ordinary business."9 Although "Campaign GM" generated substantial public interest," both proposals were
later voted down." However, "Campaign GM" demonstrated that
socially motivated proposals could be a valid concern for corporate
shareholders.
In 1972, the Commission abandoned the distinction between proposals which were motivated principally by concerns of public policy
as opposed to corporate policy-' This shift in attitude was largely
the result of Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC.' The Court

mechanics of a hearing or evidence, but so would whether such motive was the primary
one." Schwartz, supra,note 33, at 446.
85. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 448. This policy has resulted in some public-interest
questions being excluded from management's proxy statement although they dealt with
a subject matter that another shareholder might be allowed to raise. Id.
86. The goals of "Campaign GM" were to promote corporate responsibility and
to educate management and the public about the social role of corporations. Id.
87. Nine resolutions were proposed to management, but the campaign was largely
an effort to obtain support for two of them. Id. at 424.
88. Id. The two proposals included were: (1) amend the by-laws of the company to increase the number of directors by three persons. (2) creation of a shareholder
committee for corporate responsibility. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 20, 1970 at 1, col. 5; Wall St. J., March 20, 1970,
at 5, col. 1; Newsweek, April 27, 1970, at 109; Time, March 30, 1970, at 88.
92. The proposal for the shareholder committee received 2.73% of the votes cast.
The proposal to amend the by-laws received 2.44% of the votes cast. Schwartz, supra
note 33, at 430.
93. Propp, supra note 18, at 106. Prior to 1972, the Commission believed that
resolutions were important enough to justify the interposition of federal substantive rules
in place of vague state corporation law precepts, but they were not deemed to be an
appropriate method for raising broader political questions about corporate decisions. Id.
94. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1971). The proposal submitted by the Medical Committee related to Dow Chemical's continuing produc-
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Medical Committee objected
to the Commission's position 95 that shareholder's proposals raising
public policy concerns should be excluded from proxy materials." The
court held that a determination by the Commission is reviewable and
accordingly remanded the case for further administrative proceedings
within the proper limits of the Commission's discretionary authority."
The holding in Medical Committee appeared to be the product of
judicial frustration with the Commission's inconsistent and conservative policies regarding shareholder access to corporate proxy
machinery.98
In response to judicial criticism, the Commission amended Rule
14a-8 in 1972." The principal change was the elimination of the subjective inquiry into the shareholder proponent's motive as a relevant
factor to consider in determining whether a proposal should be
excluded." Issuers could now omit proposals that "consist[ed] of a
recommendation, request or mandate that action be taken with respect

tion and sale of napalm. Dow had argued, and the staff concurred, that the proposal lwas
excludable since it related to the conduct of the issuers' ordinary business or, alternatively,
was proposed primarily for the purpose of promoting a general political or social concern.
Id. at 681. It is important to note this issue was reviewed by the Commission on appeal
and that it had concurred with the staffs findings.

95. Id.
96. Propp, supra note 18, at 107.
97. 432 F.2d at 682. The court stated that "[wle think that these provisions contain persuasive indicia that the Commission's proxy procedures are possessed of sufficient 'adversariness' and 'formality' to render its final proxy determinations amenable
to judicial review . . . ." Id. at 670.
98. Schoenbaum, Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate
Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 590 (1972).
The clear impact of the language, legislative history and record of administration of section 14(a) is that its overriding purpose is to assure to corporate
stockholders the ability to exercise their right - some could say their duty
- to control the important decisions which affect them in their capacity as
stockholders and owners of the corporation.... It could scarcely be argued
that management is more qualified or more entitled to make these kinds of
decisions than the shareholders who are the true beneficial owners of the
corporation; and it seems equally implausible that an application of the proxy
rules, which permitted such a result, could be harmonized with the philosophy
of corporate democracy which Congress embodied in Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ....
432 F.2d at 681.
99. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 9784 (Sept. 22, 1972), 37 Fed.
Reg. 23,178 (1972).
100. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 656. See supranotes 72 & 84 and accompanying text for some of the problems commonly associated with a subjective analysis
of the proponents' motive.
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to any matters, including a general economic, political, racial, religious,
social or similar cause, that is not significantly related to the business
of the issuer."' ' Significantly, the Commission tacitly acknowledged
that it is appropriate for shareholders to use the proxy process to
raise social issues as long as there is a sufficient nexus01° between
those issues and the business of the corporation. 03 As a result, the
1972 amendments to Rule 14a-8 gave rise to a dramatic increase in
shareholder proposals on social issues while raising a host of new interpretive problems for the staff.' The Commission soon became concerned that given the increased requests for no-action letters by
issuers, some shareholder proponents would misconstrue the holding
in Medical Committee and attempt to appeal staff no-action
determinations. 05
In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that a no-action determination by the staff is not appealable.' °6 Such
a staff determination does not constitute an order by the
Commission.' 7 The court also held that a Commission decision to
101. Release No. 9784, supra note 99.
... ITIhe paragraph as amended provides for the omission of a proposal which
are (sic) either not significantly related to the business of the issuer or not
within its control. Proposals not within an issuer's control are those which
are beyond its power to effectuate, and henceforth they may be omitted under
this provision. The revised paragraph will apply to all proposals and will not
be limited to those which involve general economic, political, racial, religious,
social or similar causes. Also the provision is not intended to serve as a basis
for the omission of traditional shareholder proposals dealing with stockholder
relationships with management, such as cumulative voting, annual meetings
and ratification of auditors, since these matters can be considered significantly
related to the issuer's business or within its control.
102. The staff had developed an informal "one percent test" for determining when
a proposal is significantly related to a issuer's business. See, e.g., Letter to Libby-Owens
Ford Co. dated Feb. 3, 1976 (proposal requesting the board of directors to provide a report
to the stockholders concerning the company's compliance with the Arab countries' economic
boycott of Israel).
103. STArr REPORT, supra note 80, at 151. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 654.
The greatest challenge for the Commission was how to determine whether a proposal
was significantly related to business to warrant inclusion in corporate proxy material.
A second set of interpretive problems involved what evidence the staff should look to
in determining whether a proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter. Id.
104. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 657.
105. In its Supreme Court brief in Medical Committee, the Commission described
the virtual chaos that it foresaw as blighting the administrative process if advisory opinions
and enforcement decisions were reviewable in the Court of Appeals. Brief for the Petitioner at 45-48, SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
106. Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
107. The court in Kixmiller stated:
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decline review of a staff decision does not constitute a reviewable
agency ruling.0 8 While the decision did alleviate many of the Commission's concerns, growing corporate dissatisfaction with increasing
shareholder proposals on a seemingly limitless number of subjects soon
replaced these concerns.0 9
In response to mounting corporate discontent and problems
encountered in administering the shareholder proposal rule, the Commission made major revisions to Rule 14a-8 in 1976.110 One such revision was to reorganize Rule 14a-8 to enhance readability by grouping
related provisions into four paragraphs."' The number of substantive
grounds for exclusion of shareholder proposals was increased from
m " 2 The number of proposals which any one shareholder
four to thirteen.
could submit was, for the first time, limited."' The remaining parts
of the 1976 amendments evidence the Commission's effort to prevent
Our authority to directly review Commission action springs solely from Section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which confines our jurisdiction to "order[s] issued by the Commission..." We think members of the Commission's staff, like staff personnel of other agencies, "have no authority
individually or collectively to make 'orders,"' and that, on the contrary, "[ojnly
the Commission makes orders." Here the Commission made no order on the
merits of the petitioner's claim: rather, it emphatically "declined to review
the staffs position."
492 F.2d at 643-44. See also National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz,
143 U.S. App. D.C. 274, 284-85, 443 F.2d 689, 699-700 (1972), wherein the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia drew a clear line between opinions reflecting the
definite views of an agency and the considerably less authoritative rulings by subordinate officials. Id.
108. 492 F.2d at 644. Now the Commission's practice is to decline review of staff
no-action letters on shareholder proposals and thereby avoid appealability. Schwartz &
Weiss, supra note 5, at 652.
109. These prompted a review by the Commission concentrating on corporate proposals to widen the scope of the recently revised "not significantly related to" exclusion
and the "ordinary business" exclusion. Propp, supra note 18, at 108.
110. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-12999 (Nov. 22, 1976), 41
Fed. Reg. 52.994 (1976).
111. See infra note 134.
112. The Commission's efforts at defining proper subjects are included in
paragraph (C). The four prior grounds for exclusion remained. Five new grounds for
exclusion were added: 1) proposals which would result in violation of state or federal law;
2) proposals that would result in violation of the proxy rules; 3) moot proposals; 4) proposals substantially identical to other proposals submitted in the same year; 5) proposals
relating to specific dividend amounts. The other four grounds were merely a codification
of previous staff interpretive positions now centralized in paragraph (C)as follows: 1) matters beyond the issuer's power to effectuate; 2) elections to office; 3) counter proposals
to matters submitted by management; 4) proposals substantially identical to proposals
submitted in a prior year. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 151-52.
113. Release No. 34-12999, supra note 110. Prior to the 1976 amendments,
shareholder proponents were entitled to submit an unlimited number of proposals. The
statistics cited by the Commission in a release following the 1976 amendments indicated
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abuse of the shareholder proposal process. "'
As public corporations became more politicized, the staff's interpretation of the "significantly related" exclusion came under increasing criticism. 15 The impetus for this criticism was a 1978 decision
handed down by the United States Supreme Court in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti."' The Court held that a Massachusetts state
law limiting a corporation's capacity to make political contributions
interferes with speech protected under the First Amendment."' In
so holding, the Court reasoned that, "[ulitimately shareholders may
decide through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their
corporation should engage in debate on public issues.""1 8 By placing
the responsibility for controlling corporate political expenditures on
shareholders, Bellotti called into question the "significantly related"
exclusion that the Commission had previously used to limit proposals
on similar policy issues."' Analogously, if a corporation could not be
barred from speaking out on a political topic, the Commission should
not refuse a shareholder the opportunity to express his views on a
question of corporate policy with political overtones. 20 The Commission now had the task of squaring Rule 14a-8 with the Bellotti decision.
In 1980, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, in conjunction with the Commission, undertook an intensive
that the primary impact of this restriction would fall on proponents who seek to abuse
Rule 14a-8. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12598 (July 7,1976). 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982
(1976).
114. Black & Sparks, SEC Rule 14a-8: Some Changes in the Way the SEC Staff
Interprets the Rule, 11 U. ToL. L. REV. 957, 964 (1980).
115. Karmel, supra note 14, at 12.
116. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). At issue in the case was a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from making expenditures "for the purpose of... influencing or
affecting the vote on any questions submitted to voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation." MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
Ch. 55, S 8 (West Supp. 1983). In addition, the statute specified that no question submitted
to voters solely concerning the taxation of income, property, or transactions of individuals
should be deemed to materially affect the property, business or assets of the corporation. 435 U.S. at 768.
117. 435 U.S. at 795.
Such power in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment. Especially where, as here, the legislature's
suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First
Amendment is plainly offended.
Id. at 785.
118. Id. at 794-95.
119. Propp, supra note 18, at 112.
120. Id. at 113.
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study of corporate internal affairs which in part addressed the conflict between the Bellotti decision and Rule 14a-8.' 2' This study drew
upon public hearings and comments received from several different
groups, including corporations, law firms, financial institutions, public
interest groups, academicians, and government officials." Although
the report made several specific recommendations, it did not propose
any major substantive changes to the shareholder proposal rule.'"
Specifically, the report suggested that the "significantly related" and
"ordinary business" exclusions be examined in light of Bellotti.'
Although the report was received favorably by the Commission,'
recent Commission action signals an apparent retreat from some of
the corporate accountability themes stressed in the report."6
The most recent amendments adopted by the Commission' =
jeopardize the effectiveness of the shareholder proposal process. Many
of the adopted changes will enable issuers to exclude shareholder proposals on a much easier basis than before.' Curiously, the Commission has adopted these changes despite strong feelings that the
previous rule operated well." The sweeping changes adopted by the
Commission involve both procedural and substantive revisions.

III. SCOPE OF REVISIONS
Since its adoption in 1942," ° the shareholder proposal rule has
undergone a number of revisions' 1 generally directed at better defining and refining the basis for exclusion of such proposals from the
proxy statement, as well as assuring the goals of shareholder
121. Steinberg, The SecuritiesExchange Commmission'sAdministrativeEnforcement, andLegislative Programsand Policies-TheirInfluence on CorporateInternalAffairs,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 185 (1982).

122. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 29.
123. Id. at 29-30.
124. Steinberg, supra note 121, at 185.
125. Id. at 186.
126. Despite the report's recommendation, the Commission has yet to request comments on how to provide means of informing shareholders of corporate political activities
and expenditures. Steinberg, supra note 121, at 184-90.
127. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 1-8.
128. Hudson, SEC ProposesRule Changes on Holders Votes, Wall St. J., Oct. 15.
1982, at 3, col. 1.
129. Commissioner Evans defended the previous system, asserting that the
shareholder proposal process, "is one of the trappings of corporate democracy, and we
have to be careful not to snuff out that little light [of democracy." Id.
130. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
131. Including the most recent revision of Rule 14a-8, the rule has been revised
seven times: (1) 1948, Release No. 4185, 13 Fed. Reg. 3973; (2) 1952, Release No. 4775,
17 Fed. Reg. 11,430; (3) 1954, Release No. 4979, 19 Fed. Reg. 246; (4) 1972, Release
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communication.'" Currently, "[R]ule 14a-8 contains both the substantive standards which the Commission and its staff are called upon
to interpret and enforce as well as a series of procedural rules
designed to ensure that the staff is given adequate opportunity to
perform its functions."'1 Rule 14a-8 is subdivided into five paragraphs,"M four of which address the procedural rules for both the
shareholder proponent and the issuer. The remaining paragraph deals
solely with the substantive standards upon which management may
rely in seeking to omit a shareholder proposal from its proxy
statement.'"
Paragraphs (A) and (B) of Rule 14a-8 are concerned primarily with
the eligibility of a shareholder proponent to rely on the shareholder
proposal rule and the procedural requirements the proponent must
follow in submitting his proposal. ' ," Paragraphs (D) and (E) are largely
devoted to the procedural requirements that confront an issuer when
dealing with shareholder proposals.' 37 Paragraph (C) sets forth thirteen substantive criteria ' for omitting shareholder proposals from
No. 9874, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178; (5) 1976, Release No. 34-12999, 41 Fed. Reg. 53,000;
(6) 1978, Release No. 34-15384, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,522; (7) 1983, Release No. 34-20091,
47 Fed. Reg. 47,420.
132. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 496.
133. Black & Sparks, supra note 30, at 8.
134. Paragraph (A) contains procedural requirements for shareholder proponents. Paragraph (B) governs shareholder proponents supporting statements.
Paragraph (C)lists thirteen substantive grounds for exclusion of proposals. Paragraph
(D) & (E) contain procedural requirements for issuers.
135. Black & Sparks, supra note 30, at 8.
136. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 503.
137. Id. at 512.
138. Briefly stated, Rule 14a-8(C) says that the issuer may omit a proposal and
any statement in support thereof from its proxy statement and form of proxy under any
of the following circumstances: (1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the issuer's
domicile, not a proper subject for action by security holders ....

(2) If the proposal,

if implemented, would require the issuer to violate any state law or federal law of
the United States or any law of any foreign jurisdiction ....

(3) If the proposal or

supporting statement is contrary to the Commission's proxy rules and regulations ....
(4) If the proposal relates to the redress of any personal claim or grievance ....
(5) If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5% of the issuers'
total assets . . . and is not otherwise significantly related to the issuers' business;
(6) If the proposal deals with a matter beyond the issuers' power to effectuate; (7)
If the proposal deals with matters relating to ordinary business operations of the issuer;
(8) If the proposal relates to an election to office; (9) If the proposal is counter to
a proposal to be submitted by the issuer at the meeting; (10) If the proposal has been
rendered moot; (11) If the proposal is substantially duplicative of a proposal previously submitted to the issuer .... (12) If the proposal deals with substantially the same
subject matter as a prior proposal . . . if submitted at one meeting and it received
less than 5% of total votes cast, at two meetings and it received less than 8% of
the votes cast, three or more meetings and it received less than 10% of votes cast
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the issuer's proxy material."9 The thirteen criteria contained in
paragraph (C) are designed to permit exclusion from an issuer's proxy
materials those proposals which are not proper for shareholder action or constitute an abuse of the shareholder proposal process. " In
order to facilitate a better understanding of the present amendments
to Rule 14a-8 it is necessary to address the procedural and substantive provisions separately.'
A.

ProceduralRevisions

The procedural revisions in the current amendments to the
shareholder proposal rule are contained in the first four subsections of
Rule 14a-8(A), the first two subsections of Rule 14a-8(B) and in Rule
14a-8(D)."' The Commission promulgated these procedural revisions with
the hope of curbing the abuse of the shareholder proposal process and
reducing disclosure burdens on the issuer."4 Each of these changes will
be examined in turn.
The present revisions to Rule 14a-8(A)(1) increase the stringency
of the eligibility requirements necessary for a shareholder proponent
to invoke the shareholder proposal process. "4 Prior to these revisions,
a shareholder proponent only had to be a record or beneficial owner"'
of a security and continue to own such security through the date of
the meeting."4 A shareholder proponent must now satisfy both
minimum investment"7 and holding period requirements" 8 in order to
submit a shareholder proposal." 9 The Commission believes that the
present abuse can be curtailed by requiring shareholders who put the
company and other shareholders to the expense of including a proposal in a proxy statement to have some measured economic stake
or investment interest in the company.5 Under the new provision
(13) If the proposal relates to a specific amount of cash or stock dividend. 17
C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.

139. SEC DOCKET. supra note 13, at 505.
140. Id. at 505-6.
141. The procedural requirements merely lay the groundwork for the substantive determination of the propriety of the proposal. Black & Sparks, supra note 30, at 961.
142. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8 (1984). Reprinted in appendix.

143.

SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 503.

144.
145.

Karmel, supra note 14, at 8.
A beneficial owner of a security is a person entitled to the economic enjoy-

ment of a security, or who has the power to direct how the security will be voted or whether
it will be sold. SOLOMON, supra note 6, at 460.
146. 17 C.F.R..S 240.14a-8(A)(1) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
147. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. See also infra appendix.
148. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. See also infra appendix.
149. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(1) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
150. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24. Presumably, these changes would serve

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 9

242

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.19

a shareholder proponent must own at least one percent or $1,000 in
market value"' of a security which entitles him to vote at the
shareholders' meeting on his proposal."' Also, a shareholder must have
owned the securities for no less than one year prior to submission
of his proposal." Another indication of the more stringent eligibility requirements is the restriction on shareholder proponents who participate
in additional proxy solicitations." 4 The Commission believes this revision is consistent with the goals of the Proxy Review Program by reducing disclosure costs for the issuer."'
Under the most recent revisions, shareholders who submit written proxy material to a group with substantial security holdings are
unable to have theii proposals included in the issuer's proxy
statements."' Previously, there was no restriction on shareholder proponents who participated in a separate proxy solicitation."' Rule
14a-8(A)(1) now precludes shareholder proponents who have already
solicited or delivered written proxy materials to holders of more than
twenty-five percent of the outstanding stock"' from having their proposals included in the issuer's proxy material."'1 The rationale behind
this revision is that when a proponent undertakes the cost of communicating with other shareholders, it is unnecessary to impose on an
to demonstrate some requisite long-term and substantial financial commitment to a corporation. Karmel, supra note 14, at 9.
151. Karmel, supra note 14, at 2. While a group may aggregate its holdings in
order to meet the 1% or $1000 investment requirement in 14a-8(A)(1), the group could
only sponsor one shareholder proposal with the aggregated holdings. 247 CoRP. PRAC.
SEar. (BNA) (Aug. 23, 1983).
152. The securities are valued at $1000 computed by use of the average of the
bid and asked prices of such securities, as of the date within sixty days prior to the date
of submission of the proposal. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
153. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(1) (1984). Reprinted in appendix. In the event the
issuer includes the shareholder's proposal in its proxy soliciting material for the meeting
and the shareholder proponent fails to comply with the requirement that he continuously
hold such securities through the meeting date, the issuer shall not be required to
include any proposals submitted by the proponent in its proxy material for any meeting
held in the following two calendar years. Id.
154. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)1}(I) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
155. See supra note 13.
156. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
157. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(1) (1983).
158. Outstanding stock is stock issued and in the hands of the shareholders and
as such, does not include treasury stock. BLACKs LAW DIcrIoNARY 1270 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).
159. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(1) (1984). Reprinted in appendix. In the event
the issuer includes a shareholder's proposal in its proxy material and the proponent
thereafter delivers written proxy materials to the holders of more than 25 percent of a
class of the issuer's outstanding securities entited to vote with respect to such meeting,
the issuer shall not be required to include any proposal submitted by that proponent in
its proxy soliciting materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years. Id.
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issuer and its shareholders the added costs that will result from inclusion of a shareholder proposal in the issuer's proxy material."6
In an effort to streamline the proxy rules it administers, the Commission has adopted a revision to Rule 14a-8(A)(2). The shareholder proponent is no longer required to notify the issuer of his intention to appear personally at the shareholder meeting."1 The Commission believes
that the old requirement" served little purpose and only added incidental
verbiage when included with the shareholder's proposal.'1 In conjunction with the deletion of the notice requirement,' a shareholder proponent is permitted to have any person who is authorized under applicable
state law" present his proposal at the meeting.' This revision provides
greater assurance that a proposal will actually be presented at the
meeting by a well-informed person.'67
Under Rule 14a-8(A)(2), the shareholder proponent is now required
to provide proof that he satisfies the minimum investment and holding
period requirements when he submits his proposal.'" Previously, this
information had to be provided only if requested by management.'69 Also,
the proponent had only to prove that he was a beneficial owner of a
security'7 ' and that he owned such security through the date of the
160.

SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 503.

161.

Id.

162. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2) (1983). The shareholder proponent had to notify
the issuer in writing at the time he submitted his proposal of his intention to appear
personally at the meeting to present his proposal. Id.
163. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 38. See also Release No. 34-20091,
supra note 24, at 2.
164. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
165. SEC DOCKET, supranote 13, at 504. "The Commission continues to believe,
however, that where state law permits a person other than a shareholder to act as proxy
for a shareholder, such person should be permitted to present the proposal." Release No.
34-20091, supra note 24, at 2. "It must be emphasized, however, that it would continue
to be the proponent's responsibility, not his representatives, to insure that the proposal
is presented." SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
In the event that the proponent or his representative fails, without good cause,
to present the proposal for action at the meeting, the issuer shall not be
required to include any proposals submitted by the proponent in its proxy
soliciting material for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.
17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
166. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
167. Id. See Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 39.
168. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
169. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(1) (1983). "If the management requests documentary
support for a proponent's claim that he is a beneficial owner of a voting security of the
issuer, the proponent shall furnish appropriate documentation within ten business days
after receiving the request." Id.
170. Id. See supra note 145.
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meeting.' Under the present revisions a shareholder must provide
documentary support at the time he submits a proposal.' This documentary support must include the shareholder's name, address, and number
of the issuer's securities he holds of record or beneficially and the dates
upon which he acquired such securities. 3 In addition, a shareholder must
provide documentary support for any claim of beneficial ownership at
the time he submits his proposal.' Finally, the Commission adopted an
interpretive change which provides that attendance at another
shareholder meeting will no longer be good cause for failure to present
a proposal at a meeting.' The Commission concludes that this excuse
is no longer valid since a shareholder can now appoint a representative
to present his proposal at the meeting.' 6 Taken collectively, the revisions to Rule 14a-8(A)(2) will eliminate some of the busy work for
issuers and it should allow issuers to concentrate more on the issues
addressed in shareholder proposals.
The issuer must have time to fully assess a shareholder's proposal
before any benefits from the shareholder proposal process will be realized. As amended, Rule 14a-8(A)(3) extends the advance submission date
by thirty days."" Now a shareholder proponent must submit his proposal
for inclusion in the issuer's proxy materials 120 days before the filing
of preliminary proxy materials by the issuer.'78 The Commission believes
this change will benefit both the issuers' and shareholder proponents
171. Id.
172. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
173. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2. See also, Letter to Atlas Corporation, dated July 26, 1968 for the previous staff interpretation.
174. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
175. Id. See also, Letter to Atlas Corporation, dated July 26, 1968 (the staff held
that attendance at another shareholder meeting was considered good cause for failure
to present a proposal at a meeting). The Commission believes this position may be inconsistent with the provisions of the rule that are designed to assure that the proposal will
be presented for action at the meeting. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
176. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
177. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
178. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A}(3)(I) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
An exception to this rule occurs if no annual meeting was held in the previous
year or the date of the annual meeting has been changed by more than 30
calendar days from the date contemplated at the time of the previous year's
proxy statement. In this case, a proposal shall be received by the issuer a
reasonable time before the solicitation is made.
Id.
179. Frequently, the issuers have as little as ten days between the last
date for submission of prosposals and the filing date specified in Rule
14a-8(D) for submitting objections to proposals. This limited period of time
is proving inadequate for issuers to consider the security holder submissions and to prepare objections where appropriate.
SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
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by making the processing of no-action requests more efficient.1 " In
addition, the increased number and complexity of shareholder proposals and longer time necessary for printing proxy materials justifies
the increase. 8' The Commission, recognizing the problems these
changes may cause for issuers and shareholder proponents alike, has
granted an additional six-month transition period before the revision
of Rule 14a-8(A)(3) becomes effective.'" The increased amount of time
for issuers to assess shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8(A)(3)
should help to decrease the disclosure burdens on issuers.
To further reduce disclosure burdens on issuers, the Commission
has revised Rule 14a-8(A)(4) to reduce the maximum number of proposals
a shareholder can submit from two to one.'" The Commission believes
this revision will not only reduce issuer costs, but will also improve
the readability of the proxy statement.'" Moreover, the Commission
believes this will not substantially limit the ability of shareholder proponents to bring important issues before the shareholder body at
large." Theoretically, reducing the number of proposals from two to
one will not prevent the shareholder proponent from addressing an
important issue in the one proposal.
In an effort to allow shareholders a better opportunity to assess
issues in their proposals, the Commission has amended Rule 14a-8(A)(4)."
The Commission now requires inclusion of a shareholder's supporting
statement in the issuer's proxy material even when the issuer chooses
not to oppose the proposal.'" Previously, if an issuer chose not to oppose the proposal, only the shareholder's proposal was required to be
180. "An increased number of proposals and reductions in the Commission Staff
available to process contested security holder proposals have made it difficult for the staff
to provide timely responses to issuers' letters submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8(D)." Id.

181. Id.
182. "The Commission realizes that many shareholder proponents and issuers may
be adversely affected unless there is a reasonably lengthy transition period prior to the

effectiveness that will allow all interested persons adequate time to familiarize themselves
with the requirements and to comply with those requirements." Release No. 34-20091,

supra note 24, at 2.
... [W]hile all other amendments to Rule 14a-8 will be applicable to proposals submitted to issuers who file their preliminary proxy materials with
the Commission on or after January 1, 1984, the effectiveness of the new
timeliness deadlines set forth in paragraphs (A)(3) and (D) of the amended
... to July 1,1984.

rule are deferred an additional six months
Id. at 3.
183.
184.

17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(a)(4) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(B)(1) (1984). See also Release No. 34-20091, supra note
24, at 3. A supporting statement is included with the shareholder proposal to clarify and
supplement the proposal and in some instances offer background information.
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included in the issuer's proxy materials. " The Commission believes such
supporting statements will provide shareholders with background information that may be helpful in considering the proposal."'
The Commission also adopted a change in Rule 14a-8(B)(1) that provides greater flexibility to shareholders when drafting their proposals.'1'
Shareholder proponents are now able to allocate the 500 word limit between the proposal and the supporting statement any way they see fit.''
This change should alleviate the artificial division of the shareholder proponent's argument between the proposal and the supporting statement.",
The revisions adopted in Rule 14a-8(B)(1) will provide shareholders with
more information and greater flexibility without imposing any additional
burden on the issuer or the staff.'93
The Commission revised Rule 14a-8(B)(2) to alleviate some of the
present administrative problems and time constraints on the staff.H
Previously, the staff was unable, in all cases, to respond timely to
shareholder's requests for the name and address of any particular
proponent. "' The current revision provides that the Commission will no
longer disclose the name and address of a shareholder proponent who
is not identified in the issuer's proxy statement.' The Commission
believes this will allow the staff to make more efficient and better
use of its limited resources. 97 As a result, Rule 14a-8(B)(2) requires
the name and address of a shareholder proponent to either be included
in the proxy statement or be available upon request from the issuer.'98
188.
189.

17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(B)(1) (1983).
Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.

190.

Id.

191. Id. See also, Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 45. The previous
limitation on a supporting statement was 200 words in support of the proposal. 17

C.F.R.

S 240.14a-8(B)(1) (1983).

192. Summary ofComments, supranote 19, at 46. Several commentators argued
that the previous requirement encouraged numerous "whereas" clauses that detracted
from the readability of a proxy statement. Id.
193. Id. G.M. noted that the revision will probably result in longer proposals in
general, but believed that the quality of submissions would increase. Id
194. When proxy materials containing uncontested proposals are not
reviewed by the staff in accordance with the Commission's selective review
procedures, such materials are forwarded to the files before the request
arrives. Reordering these materials for the purpose of ascertaining the
names and addresses or proponents has in some instances proved to be
time consuming.
SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 505.
195. Id.
196. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
197. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 505.
198. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a.S(B)(2) (1984). Reprinted in appendix. It is important to note that Rule 14a-8(B)(2) does not require the issuer to include the shareholder's
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Consistent with its effort to alleviate present time constraints on the
staff, the Commission now requires an issuer to submit his intention
to omit a shareholder proposal earlier.
In order to allow the staff to better assess an issuer's decision to
omit a shareholder proposal, the Commission revised Rule 14a-8(D).1"'
Previously an issuer was required to notify the Commission of its intention to omit a shareholder proposal0 0 at least fifty days prior to filing
its preliminary proxy materials."' The revision increases the deadline
for notification from fifty to sixty days0 2 in advance of the filing date
of preliminary proxy materials."
The Commission has adopted this revision in conjunction with
Rule 14a-8(A)(3), which provides for a thirty-day increase in the deadline for submitting shareholder proposals.' Moreover, like the revision
adopted in Rule 14a-8(A)(3), 0 ' there will be a six-month transition
period before Rule 14a-8(D) will become effective.0 This increased time
allowed the staff under Rule 14a-8(D) should allow for a more thorough
examination of the issuer's substantive reasons for omitting a
shareholder proposal.
B. Substantive Revisions
The shareholder proposal rule enumerates thirteen grounds for
omitting shareholder proposals from corporate proxy materials. This
codifies over forty years of interpretation of the basic premise that
stockholders are entitled to act only upon those proposals which are
0
proper subjects for their consideration."
The purpose of the thirteen
subparagraphs is to balance the rights and responsibilities of a corporation's security holders, board of directors, and management."'
Each revision must be discussed with reference to those principles.
name and address in the corporate proxy materials, however, the issuer may do so at
its sole discretion. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
199. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(D) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
200. See generally, S 240.14a-8(D) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
201. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(D) (1983).
202. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4. See supra note 182. "It should be
noted that the sixty-day time frame is significantly shortened when the staff allows the
shareholder proponent to amend his or her proposal to conform to the provisions of the
rule before considering its substantive propriety." SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
203. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.
204. Id at 3,4. Thus the new timeliness requirements will apply only to shareholder
proposals submitted to issuers filing their preliminary proxy material on or after July
1, 1984. Id. at 2.
205. See supra note 178.
206. See supra note 182.
207. See supra note 138.
208. Black & Sparks, supra note 114, at 964.
209. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 658.
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The Commission revised Rule 14a-8(C)(1) to alleviate the staff's
present perceived interpretive problems in administering this
provision. 1 Traditionally, in applying the "proper subject" test,211 the
staff made difficult and often subjective judgments about the meaning of state corporation statutes.212 Over the years, the staff has
interpreted most proposals cast in the form of a recommendation or
by-law amendment to be a "proper subject" for stockholder action."'
Therefore, these interpretations have often turned on the form, rather
than the substance, of the proposal.2"
The Commission adopted a change in Rule 14a-8(C)(1) to clarify
any misconception issuers may have had concerning the staffs

210. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
211. Black &Sparks, supra note 114, at 966. "While such statutory provisions point
to the locus for decision-making, they do not purport to preclude stockholder action or
to suggest that stockholders may not act in some areas." Id.
212. "Under this approach, the staff never inquired into the substantive nature
of the proposed by-law and, as a result, even matters which were otherwise unquestionably
within the exclusive domain of the directors were made subject to shareholder action."
Id. See also, Eisenberg, CurrentApplications of the ShareholderProposalRule, 15 REv.
SEC. REG. 905 (1982). E.g., Letter to General Electric Company dated Jan. 27, 1982
(shareholder proposal requesting management to ban the use of cigarettes on company premises): Letter to Watkins-Johnson Company dated Feb. 3, 1982 (shareholder
proposal requesting management to institute a dividend reinvestment plan).
213. That interpretation was based on the experience of the staff that generally
under state corporation law a request for the board of directors to consider certain actions was deemed proper for shareholder action as it did not infringe upon the directors'
statutory authority to manage the corporation. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at
3. To reiterate what the Commission said in 1976:
jlt is the Commission's understanding that the law of most states do not,
for the most part, explicitly indicate those matters which are proper for
security holders to act upon but instead provide only that "the business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this law shall be managed by
its board of directors," or words to that effect. Under such a statute, the
board may be considered to have exclusive discretion in corporate matters,
absent a specific provision to the contrary in the statute itself, or the corporation's charter or by-laws. Accordingly, proposals by security holders that
mandate or direct the board to take certain action may constitute an unlawful
intrusion on the board's discretionary authority under the typical statute.
On the other hand, however, proposals that merely recommend or request
that the board take certain action would not appear to be contrary to the
typical state statute, since such proposals are merely advisory in nature
and would not be binding on the board even if adopted by a majority of the
security holders.
Release No. 34-12999, supra note 110, at 3.
214. Previously, the pertinent inquiry almost always concerned the form rather
than the substance of the proposal; if the proposal is in the form of a recommendation,
then the staff almost never authorized its omission under this exemption. Eisenberg,
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application of the "proper subject" provision.' 5 Specifically, the Commission revised the note accompanying Rule 14a-8(C)(1). 16 The revi-

sion reflects "an increased sensitivity by the staff to the fallacy
inherent in the view that any proposal framed as a request or recommendation to the board of directors may be deemed a proper subject

for stockholder action, regardless of the substantive content of that
proposal.21

The revision sets forth that state law governs the issue

of whether the form of the proposal, recommendatory or mandatory,
affects its inclusion in the issuer's proxy material. 28 The Commission
believes the revision will give the "proper subject" provision more
meaning and dispel any notion that the staff administers Rule
14a-8(C)(1) based solely on the form of the proposal. 19
The

exclusion'

Commission

has

expanded

the

"personal

grievance"

to make this provision also emphasize the substance rather

than the form of the proposal."1 Previously, sophisticated shareholder
proponents could avoid the exclusionary impact of Rule 14a-8(C)(4) by
drafting their proposals in broad terms of general interest to other
shareholders.' In so doing, a shareholder proponent purposely avoids
using narrow terms which would reflect his personal interest in submitting the proposal.' The present revision allows an issuer to omit
a proposal if it is designed to result in a benefit to the shareholder
proponent not shared with the other shareholders at large. ' The Coinsupra note 212. at 905.
215. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
216. The Note was first added to Rule 14a-8 in 1976 to explain the staff's interpretive approach in considering the application of Rule 14a-8(C)(1). Id."The Note, however,
has been revised to make it clear that whether the nature of the proposal, mandatory
or precatory, affects its includability is solely a matter of state law, and to dispel any
mistaken impression that the Commission's application of paragraph (0X1) is based on the
form of the proposal." Id.
217. Black & Sparks, supra note 114, at 969. See also, Letter to Rorer Group, Inc.
dated Feb. 5,1980.
218. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(1) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
219. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
220. See generally, 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(4), Reprinted in appendix.
221. Summary ofComments, supranote 19, at 58. The revised language is intended
to conform the provision to the staff's present interpretive position and to assure that
the shareholder proposal process is not being used by shareholders for personal reasons.
222. SEC DOCKET, supranote 13,at 507. Previously the staff interpreted Rule
14a-8(C)(4) very narrowly and required the issuer, in order to justify the application of
the provision, to clearly demonstrate that the proposal under scrutiny relates to a personal claim or grievance. The staff determined that this requirement was met in those
instances where the proposal or its supporting statement indicated on its face that a personal grievance existed, a rather formidable task in most instances. Id. at 506-507.
223. Id.
224. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(4) (1984). Reprinted in appendix. However, the
Commission's intent is not to exclude proposals relating to an issue in which a shareholder
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mission believes the revision will conform to the present staffs interpretive position. m In addition, the revision will prevent any further
abuse by shareholder proponents attempting to achieve personal ends
which are not necessarily in the common interests of the shareholders
in general and may not be significantly related to the issuer's
business."m
The Commission amended Rule 14a-8(C)(5) to establish objective
standards with which issuers can determine when a proposal is not
significantly related to its business.m Previously, the Commission had
attempted to develop an objective standard based on economic
significance of the proposal to the issuer. 8 However, this generated
intense criticism and was never formally adopted.'m Although the Commission believes that a totally objective standard for determining the
applicability of the "significantly related" provision is not feasible, the
staffs previous interpretation unduly limited the effectiveness of the
is personally, intellectually or emotionally committed. Release No. 34-20091, supra note
24, at 4.
225. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 58. See Release No. 34-20091, supra
note 24, at 4.
226. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4. But see, the Federal Bar Association feared that the present revision would be applied to exclude proposals of special
interest groups, such as religious organizations, where the proposal is not significantly
related to the business of the issuer and is of interest to shareholders in general. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 61.
227. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 507.
228. In interpreting prior versions of this provision, the Commission and its staff
had attempted to establish a viable objective standard for determining the circumstances
under which the subject matter of a proposal would be deemed significantly related. Eventually the staff agreed to the omission of proposals that constituted less than one percent
of company sales, assets and earnings. SEC DOCKET, supranote 13, at 508. See e.g., Letter
to American Home Products, dated May 4,1975: Letter to International Business Machines
Corporation, dated May 4, 1975 (the staff concurred with management in exclusion of proposals requesting reports on company policy regarding compliance with the Arab nations'
economic boycott of Israel because their business with Arab countries constituted less
than one percent of the company's sales, assets & earnings).
229. SEC DOCKET, supra,note 13, at 508. The staff's interpretive position before
1976 was that a proposal which related to less than one percent of a company's overall
business could be excluded under Rule 14a-(C}(5). However, in 1976, the Commission
decided not to codify the one percent economic test and stated:
In this regard, the Commission does not believe that (C)(5) should be hinged
solely on the economic relativity of a proposal, since there are many instances
in which the matter involved in a proposal is significant to an issuer's business,
even though such significance is not apparent from an economic viewpoint.
... And proposals relating to ethical issues such as political contributions
also may be significant to the issuer's business, when viewed from a standpoint other than a purely economical one.
Release No. 34-12999, supra note 110.
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exclusion.' Consequently, Rule 14a-8(C)(5) now excludes shareholder
proposals that do not affect at least five percent of a company's
business" unless the proposal is otherwise significantly related to the
issuer's business.' Thereby, the Commission codified the position that
economic data is useful in determining the significance of a matter
to the issuer's business.'s However, a proposal will not be excludable,
notwithstanding its economic insignificance, if a significant relationship is demonstrated on the face of the resolution or supporting
statement.' The Commission believes a more objective standard will

eliminate any future staff interpretive problems with Rule 14a-8(C)(5).1
The Commission adopted a significant interpretive change in
administering the "ordinary business" exclusion. Under the previous
staff interpretation, proposals submitted in the form of'a request for
a report' were rarely excludable under Rule 14a-8(C)(7).2 7 Thus,

shareholder proponents could easily circumvent the exclusionary
impact of this provision.'

Requiring issuers to include proposals solely

because those proposals are submitted in the form of a request for
a report had caused the staff to lose sight of the purpose of the
"ordinary business" exclusion.29 According to many critics,
the

230. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 509.
231. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(5) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
232. Id.
233. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 509.
234. Id. Historically, the staff has taken the position that certain proposals, while
relating to only a small portion of the issuer's operations, raise policy issues of significance
to the issuer's business. Note, however, that when the proposal relates to an area in which
the issuer has no involvement, the proposal is excludable under Rule 14a-8(C)(5). Id. See,
e.g., Letters to Long Island Lighting Company, dated Feb. 11, 1980 (cease further development, planning and construction of nuclear power plants); Owens Illinois Inc., dated Feb.
15, 1980 (liquidate the assets of the company that are located in the Republic of South
Africa); and American Home Products Corporation, dated Feb. 13, 1978 (changes in the
company's marketing and distribution of infant formula products). Where a significant
relationship is not apparent on the face of the shareholder's proposal, the shareholder,
as in the past, could demonstrate the relationship supplementally. SEC DOCKET, supra
note 13, at 509.
235. SEC DOCKET, supra, note 13, at 508.
236. Shareholders would request that the issuer prepare and disseminate a report
to shareholders or a recommendation that a special committee be formed to examine a
particular area of the issuer's business. Id. at 510.
237. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.
238. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 67.
239. Id. The policy behind this provision is to confine the solution of ordinary
business problems to the board of directors and place such problems beyond the competence and direction of the shareholders. It is manifestly impracticable in most cases
for stockholders to decide management problems at corporate meetings. SEC DOCKET,
supra note 13, at 509.
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previous staff interpretation elevated form over substance and effectively rendered the "ordinary business" exclusion a nullity.4 0
Experience shows that "[wihile the search for objective standards is
understandable, a standard which ignores the substance of the pro' Under the present
posal is hardly desirable." 41
revision, the staff will
consider whether the subject matter of the requested special report
involves a matter of ordinary business;22 where it does, the proposal
will be omitted from the issuer's proxy materials. 43
The Commission has also revised Rule 14a-8(C)(10) to concentrate
primarily on the substance of the shareholder's proposal.2 " Prior to
the revision, issuers had to include shareholder proposals in their
proxy materials regardless of whether the proposal was already
substantially implemented; 5 to require inclusion of such proposals only
fills the proxy statement with irrelevant proposals.24 In the Commission's view, shareholders and issuers alike will be better served by
an interpretation of Rule 14a-8(C)(10) that focuses on the overall
substance of the proposal and not on a particular detail.2 " Rule
14a-8(C)(10) will now permit the omission of a shareholder proposal
"substantially implemented by the issuer." 8 The Commission concedes

240. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4. See, e.g., Letters to Westinghouse
Electric Corp., dated Feb. 3,1982 (report on implications on the sale of nuclear reactors);
Westinghouse Electric Corp., dated Feb. 3, 1982 (report on equal employment and
affirmative action efforts); General Electric Company, dated Feb. 3, 1982 (information about
plant closings); Pacific Gas & Electric Company, dated Jan. 26, 1982 (report on storage
of nuclear wastes); The General Tire & Rubber Company, dated Jan. 15,1982 (disclosure
of organizations to which the company makes contributions).
241. Black & Sparks, supra note 114, at 974-75.
242. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.
243. Id.
244. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 70.
245. Eisenberg, supra note 212, at 912. Previously the staff granted no-action
requests pursuant to Rule 14a-8(C)(10) only in those circumstances where the action
requested by the proposal, was already "fully" complied with. As a result of this interpretation, shareholders have argued successfully on numerous occasions that a proposal
may not be excluded as moot, in cases where the company took most but not all of the
actions requested by the proposal, because the proposal was not "fully" complied with.
SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 510.
246. I&
247. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 70. Hence, "[wihere management
has in fact done all that a shareholder proposal seeks, it seems clear that the better result
is not to muddy the proxy statements with a wholly irrelevant proposal." Eisenberg, supra
note 212, at 912.
248. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4. Whether a proposal is moot will
still involve a factual determination on a case by case basis. SEC DOCKET, supra note
13, at 510.
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that the new interpretive position will add subjectivity to the application of Rule 14a-8(C)(10)." 9 However, the Commission believes that the
staffs previous formalistic application of Rule 14a-8(C(10) only defeated
the purpose of this exclusion.1
To better effectuate the overall objective of Rule 14a-8(C)(12),
the Commission will no longer require inclusion of proposals concerned
with substantially the same subject matter as proposals submitted
in prior years. In the past, the staff allowed relatively minor changes
in the scope or effect of a proposal to take the proposal outside the
Rule 14a-8(C)(12) exclusion." 1 The present revision to Rule 14a-8(C)(12)
allows issuers to exclude proposals dealing with substantially the same
subject matter as a proposal submitted in prior years.' The proposal
may be omitted from the issuer's proxy materials relating to any
meeting of shareholders held within three calendar years after the
last similar proposal was submitted.2 According to the Commission,
this change is necessary to signal a clean break from the strict interpretive position the staff applied to the previous provision.,
Consistent with this change in attitude, the Commission has
raised the minimum percentage of votes required for resubmission
of proposals in subsequent years. In the past, Rule 14a-8(C)(12) required
a three percent vote the first time a proposal was included, six percent the second time a proposal was voted upon, and ten percent every
year thereafter.' Under the present revision, the minimum percentage tests are increased to five percent and eight percent in the first
and second years respectively, with the final test remaining at ten
percent.2 The Commission believes that given the increased activities

249.

Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.

250. Id.
251. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 511. Critics of the staff's previous interpretation argue that shareholders are able to evade the strictures of this provision by
simply recasting the form of the proposal, expanding its coverage, or by otherwise changing

its language so it is not identical to a prior proposal. Id. For example, a proposal that
a company both terminate its operations in South Africa and make no new contracts in
South Africa was not, in the staff's view, substantially the same as a proposal that the

company make no new contracts in South Africa. See Letter to International Business
Machines Corporation, dated Feb. 3, 1982.
252. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(CI(12) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.

253. Id.
254. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.
255. 17 C.F.R. S240.14a-8(C)(12) (1983). Many issuers felt that they were continually
bearing the cost of including shareholder proposals that had generated little interest when
previously included in the proxy materials. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 75.
256. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(12) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
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of institutional investors "' with respect to shareholder proposals,a' this
revision will not substantially restrict a shareholder's access to the
issuer's proxy machinery.us This increased voting activity should, the
Commission believes, allow greater potential support for shareholders'
proposals.6 This revision is typical of the Commission's commitment
to curtailing the alleged abuse of the shareholder proposal rule.
Overall, the Commission has substantially revised the shareholder
proposal rule. These revisions represent a fundamental re-examination
of the shareholder proposal rule in accordance with the Proxy Review
Program.' The Proxy Review Program is designed to reduce
disclosure burdens, streamline requirements and promote proxy
readability.262 A meaningful distinction of these revisions should be
drawn, however, between those provisions imposing procedural
requirements on the parties involved and those relating to the substantive exclusions embodied in the shareholder proposal rule. Many of
the revisions to Rule 14a-8 have significant implications on a
shareholder's ability to influence corporate actions by use of the
issuer's proxy material.
IV.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT
REVISIONS TO RULE 14a-8

Individually, the revisions adopted by the Commission appear
innocuous, but collectively they will be overly restrictive on the
shareholder's ability to use the issuer's proxy machinery.2" The Commission appears to have lost sight of the intended purpose of Rule
14a-8.1" More importantly, the Commission has misinterpreted the present need for revisions to Rule 14a-8.s The Commission contends that
Rule 14a-8, as amended, "provides a fair and efficient mechanism for
257. Institutional investors include trust departments of commercial banks,
insurance companies, large registered investment company complexes, self administered
portfolios belonging to the largest corporate employee benefit plans, and educational
endowments and foundations.
258. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4. But see, M. EISENBERG, supra

note 7,at 56-58.
259. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.

260. Id.
261. Karmel, supra note 14, at 5.
262. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 496.
263. Lydenberg, supra note 16, at 64.
264. Congress created the Commission in 1934 to oversee and protect the basic
rights of shareholders, including the right to vote on issues of vital corporate interest.
The Commission cited cost cutting for government and industry as its motives in proposing to radically revamp the shareholder proposal system. Lydenberg, supranote 16, at 64.
265. The Commission initially considered three specific alternative proposals and
invited comment on each alternative. The three proposals are part of the Commission's
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the security holder process;"'8' when in actuality, the changes make
it considerably more difficult to achieve "fair corporate suffrage."
A. 14a-8(A)(1): Eligibility Requirements
The revisions adopted by the Commission to Rule 14a-8(A)(1) are
largely unnecessary and over-inclusive. First, this provision requires
that a shareholder proponent own $1,000 or one percent of stock for
one year to avail himself of the shareholder proposal process.' These
requirements discriminate against small or recent investors."' Further, satisfaction of the minimum investment and holding period
requirements is not dispositive of the legitimacy of a shareholder's
proposal; 9 the imposition of a refundable submission fee bears a more
logical relationship to legitimacy of a shareholder's proposal. Such a
fee would be fully refundable if a shareholder's proposal is later
included in the issuer's proxy statement. Second, Rule 14a-8(A)(1) now
states that shareholder proponents who participate in an additional
Proxy Review Program designed to reduce the burdens of compliance with the Commission's proxy rules consistent with investor protection. The three proposals are as follows:
1) would retain the current framework of Rule 14a-8 but incorporate certain revisions
to specific provisions, several interpretations thereunder and staff practices in administering the rule.
2) would permit the issuer, with the approval of its security holders, to vary the procedures
specified in the Commission's security holder proposal rule, subject to certain minimum
standards prescribed by the Commission.
3) based on the premise that security holders should have relatively unfettered access
to an issuers proxy statement. A numerical limit would be placed on the aggregate number
of proposals required to be included in any proxy statement. 397 letters of comment were
received from 383 commentators. 115 commentators supported proposal 1, while 145 commentators suggested that there should be no change in the existing rule. Twenty-four commentators expressed support for proposal 2. Only six commentators favored the adoption of proposal 3. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 1 (emphasis added). See also,
Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 7.
266. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
267. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A){1) (1984). Reprinted in appendix. See also notes
144-153 and accompanying text.
268. Karmel, supranote 14, at 9. See also, Summary of Comments, supra note 19,
at 34. Many commentators expressed the view that such eligibility requirements would
create two classes of stockholders, large and small. In addition, this may have a discouraging
effect on the already disenfranchised small investor who may wish to challenge management. Id. at 35.
269. STAFF REPORT, supranote 80, at 180. This may prevent small or temporary
stockholders from presenting a proposal that is both lawful and appropriate. Karmel, supra
note 14, at 9. Further "the staffs own examination has produced little support for the
rationale that a reasonable 'minimum eligibility' requirement would eliminate a substantial portion of the proposals, or, more importantly, that it would distinguish between
those which were offered in good faith and those which were frivolous or abusive."
STAFF REPORT. supra, note 80, at 123.
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proxy solicitation involving a large number of shareholders are
ineligible to have their proposals included in the issuer's proxy
material."0 However, this provision fails to take into account the relationship between the subject matters addressed in each proxy solicitation. Collectively, the new eligibility requirements will unnecessarily
restrain shareholder proponents with legitimate proposals from bringing them before their fellow shareholders.
1. Minimum Investment and Holding Period Requirements
The revised minimum investment and holding period requirements of Rule 14a-8(A)(1)" 1 fail to eliminate from the ranks of
shareholder proponents, activists who have in the past used the
shareholder proposal process as a publicity mechanism to further their
personal and political interests. 2 The new investment and holding
period requirements theoretically forces shareholder proponents to
demonstrate a long term and substantial financial commitment to the
issuer.?3 Unfortunately, this may allow an issuer to avoid addressing
the merits of a shareholder proposal regardless of whether it is a
valid subject for shareholder action under Rule 14a-8. Thus a
shareholder's proposal is arbitrarily excluded from an issuer's proxy
material even though the proposal may be both appropriate and proper
under the applicable state corporation law.
Significantly, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs as recently as 1980 concluded that "there is no significant evidence showing that satisfaction of a holding period or minimum
investment requirement is indicative of legitimate or abusive
proposals." ' 4 In fact, the Commission, in rejecting similar eligibility
requirements in 1976, noted that "the current eligibility requirements
have been in operation for many years and generally have not been
abused." '7 5 The Commission, moreover, has not sufficiently
demonstrated that the present eligibility requirements are being
27 6
abused.

270.

17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(1). Reprinted in appendix. See supra notes 156-60

and accompanying text.
271. To be eligible to submit a proposal, a shareholder must own at least 1% or
$1000 in market value and have held such securities for no less than one year prior to
the date on which he submits the proposal. Release No. 34-20091, supranote 24, at 2. See
supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
272. Karmel, supra note 14, at 9.
273. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
274. STAFF REPORT, supranote 80, at 180.
275.

Id.

276.

Commissioner Longstreth stated that:
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The Commission misinterprets the need for the present revisions
to the eligibility requirements.' From 1981 to 1982, the total number
of shareholder proposals submitted to issuers decreased from 991 to
850, a difference of 141 8 In addition, seventy-six fewer companies
received shareholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8 during that
period, a decrease of nearly twenty six percent. 9 More significantly,
the number of staff no-action lettersm given when compared to the
number of contested proposals " 1 decreased by ten percent in the same
period.' The interpretive changes adopted in the most recent amendments to Rule 14a-8 suggest that the staff, in the Commission's view,
may be administering the shareholder proposal rule too loosely.
However, an equally valid inference that can be drawn from these
figures is that the issuers may themselves be abusing the shareholder
proposal process by submitting frivolous requests for no-action
letters.2 1 Further, the practical difficulties inherent in the revised
minimum investment and holding period requirements outweigh many
of their benefits.
Ascertaining whether the minimum investment requirement is
met is laden with problems. Specifically, eligibility may be determined
as either a product of market performance of the stock or by the
capital needs of a particular company.' If a company makes substantial use of equity financing" or a prolonged decrease in the market
With minor exceptions, Rule 14a-8 in its present form has been in effect since

1976. The seven year record provides a strong case for continuing the Rule
essentially as it is. .... Moreover, each time we change a rule, we impose
on the community of affected businessmen, investors and professionals the
cost of having to master the changes.

Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 7.
277.

See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text.

278. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 501.
279. Typically the issuers receiving proposals are the larger and more widely
followed corporations in the country. Id.
280. See supra note 63.
281. Contested proposals are simply shareholder proposals that management
chooses to oppose and seek a staff no-action determination.
282. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 501. The amount of contested proposals in
1981 was 387 while no-action letters issued by the Division of Corporation Finance totaled
285 or approximately 74%. In 1982 there were 487 contested proposals and only 313

no-action letters issued by the Division of Corporation Finance, or approximately 64%.
283.

Despite the fact that shareholder proponents submitted 141 less proposals

in 1982, the amount of contested proposals increased by 100 for the same time period.
In addition, the percentage of no-action letters when compared to number of proposals
decreased by 10% in 1982. Arguably, this is persuasive evidence that issuers are themselves
currently abusing the shareholder proposal process.
284. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 35.
285. Equity financing means financing through the sale of shares of stock which
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price of the stock occurs, then a shareholder could suddenly become
ineligible to submit a proposal.'" Therefore, a small shareholder with
a relatively stable investment may suddenly become ineligible to submit a proposal.287
The Commission plans to alleviate this problem by use of the
average of the bid and asked prices method.288 However, this will fail
to completely compensate for market fluctuations because the average
of the bid and asked prices computation will only compensate for short
term market fluctuations and not for prolonged market decreases. 9
Moreover, this method cannot accommodate a dilution of the
shareholder's percentage of ownership due to the substantial use of
equity financing by the issuer.290 The result is that access to the
issuer's proxy materials may be effectively precluded because a
shareholder will fail to satisfy the minimum investment requirement.
This was hardly the Commission's intent when Rule 14a-8 was
originally promulgated. 91
The Commission has attempted to neutralize this effect by allowing shareholders to aggregate their holdings in order to satisfy the
minimum investment requirement. 2 This, however, is an empty
increases the amount of shares outstanding. If this increase in shares outstanding is significant, this may effect the computation of the minimum investment requirement regarding
percentage of ownership.
286. In either case there is a possibility that the shareholder's percentage of shares
owned or market value of those shares will fall below minimum investment requirements
and he will then be ineligible to submit a shareholder proposal.
287. A shareholder with a small stable investment faces a real possibility of becoming ineligible to submit a proposal despite the fact that the shareholder has made a good
faith attempt to comply with the eligibility requirements. Summary of Comments, supra
note 19, at 35.
288. Release No. 34-20091, supranote 24, at 2. The bid price is that which dealers
are currently offering to buy the security for. The asked price is that which dealers are
currently offering to sell the security for. K. SMITH & D. EITEMAN, ESSENTIALS OFINVESTING

77-78 (1974). Quotatations of such bid and asked prices for an over-the-counter stock may
be secured through stockbrokers who can obtain information through a computerized network that furnishes continuous quotations or through printed sheets that are revised daily.
SOLOMON, supra note 6, at 803.
289. The use of averaging can only eliminate the effects of short term fluctuations and cannot really accommodate for prolonged market decreases.
290. The use of the average of the bid and asked prices method does not use
shareholdings in the computation. As a result, it will be unable to compensate for a substantial increase in the amount of stock outstanding. A single extreme value, such as a prolonged decrease in the value of the stock, can effect the average to such an extent that
it is debatable whether it is really representative or typical of the data. J. FREUND,
MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 36 (4th Ed. 1972).

291. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
292.. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2. See supra note 151.
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gesture and will benefit few, if any, shareholders. 93 Shareholders are
frequently geographically dispersed and their only contact with the
company is through management's proxy solicitation." Furthermore,
since shareholder lists' are seldom made public, many shareholders
are unaware of the identity of other shareholders.2 These facts make
it highly unlikely that shareholders will be able to contact each other
in order to aggregate their shareholdings. Consequently, allowing
shareholders to aggregate their shareholdings to meet the minimum
investment requirement will not lessen the hardship of the new
eligibility requirements.
The minimum holding period requirement creates substantial
hardships on shareholder proponents without hardly any correspond-

ing benefit to the shareholder proposal process.2 7 No logical relation-

ship exists between the length of time a shareholder holds his stock
and the amount of support a shareholder proposal can generate." 8 The
relevant inquiry is not the length of time the shares have been held,
but rather the issue which the proposal addresses. 2" A minimum
holding period requirement would exclude certain shareholder proposals without regard to the welfare of the corporation;' therefore,
the duration of ownership should not be one of the requirements for
a shareholder to submit proposals.
In sum, to preclude submission of a shareholder proposal based

293. See infra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
294. Elliot, supra note 27, at 68.
295. Shareholder lists are a compilation of the names and addresses of the
shareholders. The availability of a shareholder list is a question of state rather than federal
law. Schwartz, supranote 33, at 491-92. Many state inspection statutes impose limitations
on the right of inspection, especially as to persons eligible to assert the right and as to
specific records subject to inspection. SOLOMON, supra note 6. at 296.
296. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 491.
297. See infra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
298. STAFF REPORT, supranote 80, at 181. "On the subject of the minimum holding
period, the staff has no comprehensive data available on the period for which proponents
have held their stock, or, more important, on the correlation, if any, between the holding
period and the likelihood the shareholder is 'abusing' the proposal process." Id. at 184.
299. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 33.
300. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 183. A dramatic example of the lack of correlation between shareholdings and the ultimate success of a shareholder proposal was
a proposal to Detroit Edison recommending that the company meet its energy needs by
methods other than nuclear power, until questions regarding public safety and economics
were solved. Despite the fact that the shareholder proponent only held six shares of stock,
the proposal received 10.16% support. The 1979 Proxy Seasonw How Institutions Voted on
ShareholderResolutions andManagement Proposals,prepared by the Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc. (cited in STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 182).
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on a minimum investment and holding period requirement is too
restrictive given the lack of justification. Specifically, the revised
eligibility requirements will restrict access to the corporate proxy
machinery for small or recent shareholders. No logical relationship
exists between small or recent shareholders and the present abuses
of the shareholder proposal process." 1 Also, many shareholder activists
who abuse the shareholder proposal process are well financed and
frequently satisfy the revised eligibility requirements. 2 A more
reasonable approach is to direct any deterrent provision at the group
most likely to be responsible for the present abuse.
Imposing a fee on shareholders whose proposals are subsequently
excluded from the issuer's proxy statement is a more appropriate
deterrent to the present abuses of Rule 14a-8. The advantage of this
method is that a more direct relationship exists between those
shareholders whose fee is not refunded and those shareholders who
are currently abusing the shareholder proposal process. A fee would
deter professional stockholder activists and discourage frivolous proposals as well as the revised eligibility requirements will. 3 However,
the imposition of a fee would not arbitrarily exclude a shareholder
proposal without considering its merits, as is ultimately done under
the revised eligibility requirements."' Also, a fee would arbitrarily
not exclude those proposals that are appropriate under applicable state
law.3 5

Under this proposed revision, each shareholder proponent would
be assessed a $100 refundable fee for each proposal submitted.' Those
shareholders who submit proposals which are either not opposed from

301. STAFF REPORT, supranote 80, at 183.
302. Id. at 181.

303.

Only shareholders who submit proposals that are later excluded from the

issuer's proxy statements bear the burden of the fee. Further, the fee would probably
encourage more careful drafting of the proposals.
304. Under Rule 14a-8(A)(1), if a shareholder fails to meet the minimum investment and holding period requirements, then the proposal is excluded regardless of its
merits. This is an arbitrary ban on proposals submitted by small or recent investors.
However, with a submission fee, any shareholder who is legitimately interested in submitting a proposal can do so if he chooses.
305. A fee is only assessed on those proposals subsequently not deemed a proper
subject for shareholder action under Rule 14a-8 and ultimately excluded from the issuer's
proxy statement.
306. Each shareholder proponent pays the fee when he submits his proposal and
only if the proposal is later included in the proxy statement will the fee be fully refunded.
The $100 figure was the one most commonly preferred by commentators who responded
to this issue. See, Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 54.
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the start or later deemed appropriate for inclusion in the issuer's proxy
materials' would be refunded their fee. The imposition of a fee would
deter frivolous proposals as well as encourage careful drafting of each
proposal.
Imposing a fee on shareholder proponents is, however, not
without its problems. Theoretically, imposing a fee would be a heavier
burden on small investors.3 8 Also, given the substantive tightening
up of the recent amendments to Rule 14a-8, the risk of non-inclusion
of a shareholder's proposal may minimally deter legitimate proposals.
However, a small shareholder would not face a total inability to submit a proposal as he will in the case of the revised minimum investment and holding period requirements.' Also, a small or recent
shareholder who wishes to gain access to the issuer's proxy machinery
would have his $100 submission fee fully refunded if his proposal were
later included in the issuer's proxy statement. Imposition of a fee
would, as a result, be more consistent with the policy of "fair cor31 Furthermore,
porate suffrage.O
the imposition of a fee on those
shareholders whose proposals are later excluded from the issuer's
proxy materials acts as a formidable deterrent but is not overinclusive
as are the revised eligibility requirements.
The imposition of a fee on shareholder proponents would ensure
that any legitimately interested shareholder would not be arbitrarily
precluded from participating in the shareholder proposal process.
Specifically, imposing a fee on shareholder proponents would not
discriminate against small or recent shareholders; every shareholder
proponent who submits a proposal, whether a large or small investor,
will be assessed a $100 fee when he submits his proposal. However,
those shareholders whose proposals are later included in the issuer's
proxy materials will have their shareholder proposal submission fee
fully refunded. As a result, those shareholder proponents who abuse
307.

If the issuer does not oppose the proposal when it is submitted, then the

shareholder proponent is refunded his fee. If the staff refuses to issue a no-action
letter and the proposal is later included in the issuer's proxy material, that the fee
will also be fully refunded.
308. The $100 submission fee may prevent some small shareholders from submitting a proposal. However, this alternative will allow those shareholders who are
legitimately interested, enough to pay the submission fee, to have management address
the merits of their proposals.
309. See supra note 304.
310. With the shareholder submission fee there is no arbitrary restriction on access
to the corporate proxy machinery. Small or recent shareholders would be treated the same
as other shareholders.
311. See supra note 304.
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the shareholder proposal process will bear the burden of the fee
instead of subjecting innocent shareholder proponents to arbitrary
eligibility requirements.
2.

Participation in Additional Proxy Solicitation.

The exclusion of shareholder proposals based solely on a
shareholder proponent's participation in an additional proxy solicitation is overinclusive"2 This revision will further exacerbate the
inequities that now exist between issuers and shareholders. 13 A
shareholder's proposal is frequently overwhelmed in an issuer's proxy material, since management has no length restrictions imposed on
them when rebutting a shareholder proposal. 14 In addition, the exclusion of a proposal when there is no logical nexus"'5 between the subject matter of the proposal and that of the additional proxy solicitation is arbitrary and unreasonably restrictive.
Significantly, Rule 14a-8(A)(1) fails to specify whether any connection is needed between the subject matter addressed in the additional proxy solicitation and that of the shareholder's proposal. 16
Unless there is a connection, there are arguably no duplicative costs
imposed on the issuer and its shareholders."' 7 Arbitrary exclusion of
a shareholder's proposal under this provision may significantly
decrease the amount of pertinent information available to shareholders
in formulating an intelligent vote. Without this information supplied
by the proposals, the shareholders will have insufficient knowledge
of the manner in which their interests are being served.
To alleviate this problem, Rule 14a-8(A)(1) should only exclude
a shareholder's proposal if it involves the same subject matter as the
other proxy solicitation. To require inclusion of proposals involving
the same subject matter only imposes on the issuer and its
312. See infra note 316-17 and accompanying text.
313. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 37.
314. Id.
315. If the subject matters are not related, then allowing a shareholder to participate in an additional proxy solicitation should promote disclosure. "[I]n
a democratic
society, rival groups must stand in a fairly equal position in regard to their opportunities
to place issues and candidates before the voters." E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, sura
note 3, at 9.
316. Many commentators who addressed this issue felt that such a scenario
restricts the flow of information to shareholders instead of encouraging it. Summary of
Comments, supra note 19, at 37.
317. The Commission cited duplicative costs as the primary reason in adopting
the restriction on participating in an additional proxy solicitation. SEC DOCKET, supra
note 13, at 503,
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shareholders additional and unnecessary costs of printing and mailing lengthier proxy materials. 18 More significantly, exclusion of
shareholder proposals concerning the same subject matter as other
proxy solicitations for the same annual meeting does not hinder
disclosure or prevent an informed shareholder vote. 19 This method
would insure fairer representation and adequate disclosure while
preventing duplicative costs and the arbitrary exclusion of shareholder
proposals.
To facilitate a more equal representation within the proxy statement, a 1000-word limit should be placed on management's replies to
a shareholder's proposal.'m This would provide a more equal forum
for competing views.2 ' Much of the present reason for shareholder
participation in more than one proxy solicitation is to undermine
management's ability to overwhelm an individual shareholder's proposal with lengthy replies." While corporate proxy materials should
give adequate coverage to each competing view, in reality, this rarely
happens because management faces no limitations when responding
to shareholder proposals.' A 1000-word limit would help equalize
management and shareholder influence on voters.
The 1000-word limitation does not, however, limit management's
ability to inform shareholders of its own. views as well as the ramifications of each shareholder proposal. Further, a 1000-word limitation
would substantially improve readability of the proxy statements;' and
given the competent legal counsel retained by many large companies,

318.
319.

Id.
Arguably, since the subject matter is being brought before the shareholders

in the proxy solicitation, the disclosure requirements have been met.
320. Presently, an issuer is under no word limitations when responding to
shareholder proposals. Frequently, this leads to a situation where management simply
overwhelms a shareholder proposal with its views.
321. See supra note 315.
322. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 37.
[Wlith regard to intracorporate communication, the corporate structure is

not dissimilar to a one party town where the newspaper, radio, and TV station are under singular control. Those in dissent, without the resources to
establish their own media, will be unable to effectively express their ideas
and will rarely witness these ideas being so expressed by others. The
remainder of the populace is, thus, deprived of the opportunity to consider
or act upon a viewpoint critical of those in power.
Schulman, supra note 17, at 42.
323. Note, supra note 42, at 1372-73.
324. Proxy readability is one of the three goals of the Proxy Review Program.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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this word limitation should not prevent management from performing their disclosure function.
B. 14a-8(A)(2): Notice Requirements
The amendments adopted by the Commission to Rule 14a-8(A)(2)
are a positive step in streamlining the existing proxy rules. The Commission deleted various requirements from this provision which
previously served little purpose.2 For example, a shareholder proponent will no longer have to notify an issuer of his intention to appear
personally at the meeting.2 Also, a shareholder proponent will now
be able to appoint a representative to present his proposal at the
shareholders' annual meeting.' Finally, a shareholder proponent must
disclose to the issuer at the time he submits his proposal, his name,
address, the number of shares he owns, and the dates upon which
he acquired such securities."
The previous requirement that a shareholder notify the issuer
of his intention to appear personally at the annual meeting served
little purpose; it did little to insure that a proposal would get
presented at the annual meeting. In the past, shareholder proponents
who had previously notified the issuer of their intention to appear
frequently failed to present their proposals at the annual meeting. 29
Moreover, there are sanctions available under Rule 14a-8(A)(2) to
ensure that a proposal will be presented at the annual meeting.'
Under Rule 14a-8(A)(2) if a proponent fails to present a proposal at
the annual meeting without good cause, the issuer is not required
to include any proposals submitted by this proponent for the next
two calendar years."' Consequently, the previous requirement was
nothing more than a mere formality and its deletion is consistent with
the goals of the Proxy Review Program.n
In conjunction with the deletion of the notice requirement, a
shareholder proponent will now be able to appoint a representative
to present his proposal at the annual meeting under Rule 14a-8(A)(2).31
325.
326.
327.
164-67 and
328.
168-72 and
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2.
Id. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2) (1984). Reprinted in appendix. See supra notes
accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2 (1984). Reprinted in appendix. See supra notes
accompanying text.
Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 38.
17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
Id.
Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 38.
See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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Under this revision, it is more likely that a proposal will be presented
at the annual meeting by an informed person." If a shareholder proponent is unable to present his proposal he should be able to choose
a representative' he feels is competent to present his proposal. Such
a revision acknowledges that the proxy system's goals are competent
presentation of proposals, and informed shareholder votes.- Permitting shareholder proponents to choose a representative should allow
them greater flexibility in the future. As a result, the Commission
will no longer recognize a shareholder's attendance at a different
shareholder meeting as a good cause for failure to present his proposal at the annual meeting.17 This decision is sound in light of the
3
increased flexibility allowed a shareholder in presenting his proposal.
However, the Commission's decision to eliminate the requirement
that an issuer include the shareholder proponent's name, address, and
number of shares owned in its proxy statement will inhibit comprehensive disclosure. Due to space limitations placed on a shareholder's proposal and its supporting statement, shareholders frequently need more
information to properly assess the proposal;' requiring that this
information be included in the issuer's proxy materials may encourage
shareholders to seek out additional information to formulate an
informed vote." To require inclusion of a shareholder proponent's
name, address, and number of shares in the proxy statement would
properly encourage such inquiries.
C.

14a-8(A)(3) and 14a-8(D): Timeliness Requirements

Rules 14a-8(A)(3) and 14a-8(D) were amended to give issuers and
the Commission more time to adequately assess a proposal.' Under
Rule 14a-8(A)(3), a shareholder proponent will now have to submit a

334. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504. See supra note 165.
335. The representative must be chosen at the onset, and must be permitted under
applicable state law to present the proposal for action at the meeting. SEC DOCKET,
supra note 13, at 504.
336. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
337. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 2. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
339. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 57.
340. "The value of information is proportional directly to the extent it is utilized.
Rule 14a-8 proceeds on this theory and seeks to stimulate participation in corporate affairs
by affording security holders methods of contacting their fellows." Emerson & Latcham,
SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Towards More Effective Stockholder Participation,59 YALE
L.J. 635 (1950).
341. See supra notes 178.82, 199-203 and accompanying text.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 9

266

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.19

proposal thirty days earlier to allow the issuer more time to assess
the merits of the proposal. Rule 14a-8(D) now requires the issuer to
submit its intention to exclude a shareholder proposal ten days earlier,
to give the Commission more time to assess both the proposal and
the issuer's reason for excluding it."2 Allowing both the issuer and
the Commission more time to assess shareholder proposals should increase the effectiveness of the shareholder proposal process.
The new time periods for submission of proposals to the issuer
and notification to the Commission of the issuer's intention to omit
a proposal will better serve the interests of the parties involved." 3
The issuers, frequently, were not able to adequately assess the
shareholder proposals they received. The inadequacies of the previous
time constraints did a great disservice to shareholder proponents."
Under the new revision, issuers will be better able to assess the merits
of a shareholder proposal." 5 Also, with more time to examine
shareholder proposals, the issuers will be less likely to make frivolous
requests for no-action letters from the staff. Finally, the additional
time the Commission has to examine shareholder proposals will allow
for a more consistent interpretation of the shareholder proposal rule.
However, increasing the time allowed to the issuer may have
a very undesirable effect when considered in conjunction with the
revised holding period requirement." The 120 day advance submission period for the shareholder proponent, when combined with the
one year holding period requirement, means that a shareholder must
wait sixteen months before he can submit a shareholder proposal for
inclusion in the issuer's proxy materials."7 This will substantially
increase the inequities for recent shareholders."8 This prolonged submission period will apply without consideration of the merits of the
proposal.3"
342. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504. The Commission believes such a change
will provide the staff with more time to deal with the increased number and complexity
of the security holder proposals being submitted. Id. at 512.
343. Id. at 504.
344. Id. Also, the desire for expediency and simplicity in the performance of its
administrative duties has put pressure on the staff to cut corners where possible. Note,
The SEC and No-Action Decisions Under Proxy Rule 14a-8: The CaseForDirect Judicial
Review, 84 HARv. L. REV. 847 (1971).
345. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 504.
346. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 45.
347. Id.
348. In addition to the burden of the new eligibility requirements adopted in
Rule 14a-8(A)(ll.
349. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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This undesirable effect would be eliminated if the minimum
investment and holding period requirement were replaced by the
shareholder submission fee. Under this arrangement, increasing the
time periods the staff and issuers have to deal with shareholder proposals would no longer result in inequities for recent shareholders.
A useful deterrent for frivolous shareholder proposals would still
exist'- but without the arbitrary exclusion of valid shareholder proposals that will occur under the recently-revised eligibility
requirements. The use of the shareholder submission fee would not
require more drastic measures to eliminate the perceived abuses of
the shareholder proposal rule.
D. 14a-8(A)(4): Number of Proposals
In Rule 14a-8(A)(4), the Commission has reduced the number of
proposals a shareholder can submit from two to one."' This reduction
is both unjustified and unnecessary. Moreover, this will seriously
hinder a shareholder's
ability to bring important issues before the
3 52

other shareholders.

The reduction of the number of proposals a shareholder can submit will unreasonably restrict shareholder access to the corporate
proxy machinery. While the purported goal of this revision is to prevent abuse of the shareholder proposal process, the Commission has
failed to show that limiting the number of proposals will further this
goal. ' - Given the other revisions to Rule 14a-8, this reduction may
be unnecessary to prevent shareholder abuse." Instead, it will result
in the suppression of competing ideas. Also, given the scope and complexity of corporate activity, a shareholder may have more than one
valid area of concern;15 the shareholder now will be unable to bring
these additional issues before the shareholder body.
A fee requirement would eliminate the need to reduce the
number of proposals a shareholder can submit under Rule 14a-8(A)(4).
The imposition of a fee on shareholder proponents, if added to the
previous requirement of two proposals per proponent," would
350. Shareholder proponents who submit frivolous proposals will forfeit their
shareholder submission fee.
351. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
352. Many of the commentators responding to this issue argued that, "the need
to implement the reduction had not been demonstrated, that there is not convincing
evidence of abuse or excessive burdens in connection with the previous rule." Summary
of Comments, supra note 19, at 49-50.
353. Id.

354.
355.

Id.
Id.

356.

17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(4) (1983).
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adequately control the number of proposals submitted. A fee requirement, consequently, would allow shareholder proponents to adequately
address relevant issues without significantly restricting shareholder
access to the corporate proxy machinery.
E.

14a-8(B)(1): Supporting Statements

The revisions to Rule 14a-8(B)(1) will allow shareholder proponents
greater flexibility when drafting a proposal and supporting statement.
A shareholder proponent is now able to allocate the 500-word limit
between his proposal and supporting statement any way he chooses., 7
Significantly, this revision will not increase the burden of disclosure
on the issuer;'" instead, it alleviates the arbitrary division of a
shareholder's proposal and supporting statement, thereby improving
proxy readability. " This will allow for a "more lucid and cogent
presentation of a proposal."3
Under these circumstances, the advantages of the revisions to
Rule 14a-8(B)(1) extend beyond those that accrue to the individual
shareholder proponent; these revisions will greatly enhance proxy
readability for fellow shareholders"'Issuers are now required to
include supporting statements in the proxy materials even when they
do not oppose the proposal."' Hence, the shareholder proposal and
supporting statement will have greater clarity and be more complete.
Requiring inclusion of supporting statements, even though the issuer
does not oppose the shareholder proposal, should help promote a more
informed shareholder vote.3 Fairness requires that shareholders be
given proxy materials with complete and cogent proposals to
adequately assess such proposals before casting their vote.'"

357. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
358. Summary of Comments, supranote 19, at 46. See also SEC DOCKET, supra
note 13, at 505.
359. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
360. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 46. See also, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Release No. 34-17517 (Feb. 5, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 12,011 (1981). 21 SEC
DOCKET (CCH) 1546 (1981).
361. Release No. 34-20091, supra,note 24, at 3.
362. Id.
363.

"... anyone who solicits proxies, whether management or an outside group,

must supply the security holder with adequate information so that he may exercise an
informed judgment in voting his shares." Emerson & Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal
Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. CH. L. Rav. 807 (1952). See supra note 193.
364. See supra note 192.
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14a-8(B)(2): Identification of Proponent

The revision to Rule 14a-8(B)(2) will require issuers, instead of
the Commission, to provide names and addresses of shareholder proponents upon request.' This is a positive revision which will eliminate
the present administrative problems such requests commonly cause'"
and should be required of the issuer and not the Commission. Since
shareholder proponents must now submit their names and addresses
along with their proposals387 the issuer will have this information at
its disposal. To further improve this positive revision, the issuer should
be required to include the shareholder proponent's name and address
in the proxy materials to encourage communication among the
shareholders.
G. 14a-8(C)(1): Proper Subject for Shareholder Action
The revision of the note accompanying Rule 14a-8(C)(1) to reflect
that state law governs the admissibility of a proposal creates a meaningless distinction. The revision makes it clear that state law and not
the staffs practice governs whether a proposal, submitted in the form
of a recommendation, is includable in an issuer's proxy materials. 8
However, most state corporation laws offer little guidance because
they are drafted in vague terms.38 Also, if many of the "management
statutes"7' were interpreted narrowly by the staff, the shareholder
proposal process would become a nullity. As a result, the staffs practice of allowing the inclusion of a proposal which takes the form of
a recommendation is necessary to preserve "fair corporate suffrage."
The inherent difficulty in applying the "proper subject" test 7 '
stems from the fact that most state corporation statutes employ sweeping language.3 2 Specifically, in most states the board of directors is
granted the general power to manage the business and affairs of the

365. "The staff has not been able in all cases to respond in a timely fashion to
security holder's requests for the name and address of any particular proponent." SEC

DOCKET, supra note 13, at 506.
366.
367.

See supra note 194.
17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(A)(2) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.

368. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
369. L. Loss, 2 SECURITIES REGULATION 905 (2d Ed. 1961). See also supra note 49
and accompanying text.
370. Usually these statutes contain provisions which expressly require that certain types of corporate action be initiated by the board of directors.
371. Determining whether a proposal submitted by a shareholder concerns a proper
subject for shareholder action under applicable state law.
372. Black & Sparks, supra note 114, at 966.
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companyOn Complicating this analysis is the lack of case law interpreting such statutes. As a result, the only way the staff can effectuate the purpose of Rule 14a-8(C)(1) is to adopt a federal "common
law" under the guise of interpreting state law 47" Within this "common law," there is some authority which supports a shareholder's right
to make recommendations to management. 5
Where proposals are submitted in the form of a recommendation, the pertinent inquiry should concern the form rather than the
substance of the proposal. The Commission interprets the corporate
law of most states as permitting shareholder proposals in the form
of recommendations. 6 Thus, it is the staffs practice to require inclusion of a proposal submitted in the form of a recommendation despite
the fact that a shareholder has no power to direct this type of action.'
Through this practice, the Commission generally seeks to promote
shareholder participation. Requiring inclusion of advisory proposals
in the issuer's proxy materials is a positive solution to possible conflicts with state laws.1 8 Given the present trend 9 and composition
of many of the state corporation laws,38 the Commission has chosen
"the lesser of two evils."'"
The new language adopted by the Commission in the note
accompanying Rule 14a-8(C)(1) will not alter the staffs present practice of elevating form over substance." The staff will still resort to
the same practice as before due to the vague language of the state

373. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 440.
374. Elliot, supra note 27, at 54. See also Schwartz, supra note 33, at 440.
375. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
376. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
377. Kapp & Bancroft, No-Action Highlights, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 71,73-80 (1975). It
is important to note that a shareholder proposal submitted in the form of a recommendation, even if adopted by the stockholders, would not be binding on the board of directors.
378. Note, supra note 42, at 1347.
379. Professor Cary characterizes the recent trend as a "race for the bottom,"
with Delaware leading the way. Other states simply want to encourage companies to stay
at home and these states therefore try to emulate Delaware by revising their acts along
similar lines. Today, state corporation laws are "described as 'enabling' acts - enabling
management to operate with minimal interference." Cary,Federalism and CorporateLaw:
Reflections UponDelaware,83 YALE L.J. 663,666 (1974). See also Fischel, The "Race To The
Bottom" Revisited-Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware'sCorporationLaws,
76 Nw. U.L. REv.913 (1982).
380. See supra note 49.
381. If the "management" statutes are interpreted too narrowly, Rule 14a-8 would
become a nullity. In a practical sense, the staffs elevation of form over substance gives
some meaning to the shareholder proposal process.
382. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 83.
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corporation statutes. ' Given that state law is often of little help in
determining whether a proposal can be excluded, it appears that the
staff has little choice but to elevate form over substance. If the staff
strictly interprets the state "management statutes,"' ' it will
unreasonably restrict shareholder access to the issuer's proxy
materials. However, the staff's practice of including proposals submitted in the form of a recommendation under Rule 14a-8(C)(1) is the
only instance when it is advisable to elevate form over substance in
interpreting Rule 14a-8.11
H. 14a-8(C)(4): Personal Claim or Grievance
The "personal grievance" exclusion permits management to
exclude proposals which primarily address the individual shareholder
proponent's dissatisfaction instead of a broad managerial concern. 8
The new revision has both subjective and vague terms" ' that will be
likely to cause the staff greater interpretive problems with the "personal grievance" exclusion. Since all shareholder proposals are
motivated by some type of dissatisfaction, ' a more subjective analysis
could result in unreasonably restricting shareholder access to the
issuer's proxy machinery.
The revision adopted by the Commission in Rule 14a-8(C)(4) will
only create additional interpretive problems for the staff. Rule
14a-8(C)(4) will now require the staff to determine whether a proposal
is designed to result in a benefit not shared by other shareholders. 8 9
This new language is even more susceptible to a broad interpretation
by the staff than was the previous language. ' Further, given the
383. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 370. Essentially these corporation statutes do not address

stockholder
385.
386.
387.

action.
See infra notes 418-19 and accompanying text.
Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.
Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 60. Also, there is a greater danger

that they will be interpreted by the staff more broadly than was the case with the previous
provision. Id.
388. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80,at 184.
389. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24. at 4. A proposal could conceivably be
exluded from an issuer's proxy material, even though it might relate to matters which
may be of general interest to all security holders, if it is clear from the facts presented
by the issuer that the proponent is using the proposal as a tactic designed to redress a
personal grievance or further a personal interest. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 507.
390. Summary of Commets, supra note 19, at 60. In referring to the previous
language of Rule 14a-8(C)(4), the Commission noted that this was, "the most subjective
provision and definitely the most difficult for the staff to administer ....SEC DOCKET,
supra note 13, at 507.
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diversity of shareholder interests, almost any proposal can be perceived as not designed to result in a benefit to the shareholders as
a whole. 91
To require the staff to go beyond the face of the proposal to
determine personal motivation is inappropriate." The Commission
believes that sophisticated shareholder proponents have abused Rule
14a-8(C)(4) in the past by drafting their proposals in sufficiently broad
terms to obscure the personal interests that motivated their proposals. 93 The result is that an individual's interests are only discernible in varying degrees. Notwithstanding, the staff is unequipped with
any effective fact-finding mechanisms to properly discern a shareholder
proponent's state of mind. 94 Hence, to ask the staff to make a subjective determination given these circumstances will only result in inconsistent interpretation of Rule 14a-8(C)(4) 95
If Rule 14a-8(C)(4) is interpreted broadly it could be used by
issuers to unreasonably restrict shareholder access to the issuer's
proxy materials. Moreover, management's attempt to exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(C)(4) may primarily reflect their opposition to
the shareholder's proposal, which proposal, if later included in the
proxy statements would force management to publicly defend its position in the proxy materials. Also, issuers are just as likely as
shareholders, if not more so, to fully exploit broadly-interpreted pro39 6
visions of Rule 14a-8.
I.

14a-8(C)(5): Not Significantly Related to the Issuer's Business

The new objective economic standard' adopted by the Commission to Rule 14a-8(C)(5), requiring that a shareholder's proposal relate
to at least five percent of the issuer's business, ignores the practical
realities of its application.3 9" This standard effectively insulates the

391. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 61.
392. See supra notes 72, 84 for some problems likely to be encountered.
393. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.
394. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 446. Essentially the staff is furnished only with
documents and an opinion of counsel to make a decision whether the proposal must be
included in the proxy statement. "The only thing it can rationally decide is whether the
language of the proposal is proper for shareholders: motive, on the evidence before the
Commission, is entirely speculative." Id.
395. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 60.
396. Id.
397. Karmel, supra note 14, at 9.
398. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(4) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
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largest companies from shareholder proposals on important issues. 99
Issuers will be likely to perceive the economic criteria as overshadowing the rest of the provision in Rule 14a-8(C)(5).'0 Equally important,
a broad interpretation of Rule 14a-8(C)(5) by the staff will directly contradict the Supreme Court's holding in Bellotti.' 1 A more appropriate

economic test would be the application of a stated percentage on a
sliding scale to take into consideration the amount of business an issuer
transacts. In addition, a liberal interpretation of the provision that
permits inclusion of economically insignificant proposals, will insure

that Rule 14a-8(C)(5) is not overshadowed by the economic criteria.
A particularly disturbing trend in the amendments on the whole,
is that in the search for more objective standards, the Commission
has overlooked the practical realities of many corporate
undertakings.' 2 Given the large size of many corporations, matters

of substantial concern to shareholders are quite likely to involve less
than a stated percentage of the- issuer's business." 3 The revision of

the Rule 14a-8(C)(5) requiring that a shareholder proposal relate to
at least five percent of the company's business, ignores this problem.

Taken to a logical extreme, the larger and more diversified the company is, the less likely it is that shareholders will be able to submit
proposals on matters of corporate policy.1 4 Thus, those corporations
with the largest impact on society will be less accountable to their

shareholder constituency than smaller, more concentrated
corporations." 5 Focusing on economic criterion conceivably silences
shareholder input on important political and ethical implications of

company activities despite these vital areas' economic insignificance
under the new revision to Rule 14a-8(C)(5).
399. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 192. Such a result would seem to be
diametrically opposed to the underlying purpose of Section 14 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. Id See supra note 34.
400. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 65.
401. Id. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
402. This is also readily apparent in the revisions to Rule 14a-8(CX12) adopted by
the Commission. See infra notes 435-37 and accompanying text.
403. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 667. Also, in light of the recent trend
of public corporations becoming increasingly politicized, areas which may now be
economically insignificant under Rule 14a-8(C)(5) may be of substantial concern to
shareholders. Karmel, supra note 14, at 12.
404. Summary of Comments, supranote 19, at 65. Further complicating this is the
fact that many social and ethical issues cannot be easily translated into a percentage of
assets or revenue. Id. at 64.
405. STAFF REPORT, supranote 80, at 191. Thus, in those companies with the largest
revenues or asset values shareholders may be unable to submit proposals addressing timely
and important issues when shareholders in a smaller company are allowed to.
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Issuers may place greater weight on the economic significance
test of Rule 14a-8(C)(5) than on the remainder of the provision. The
remaining provision provides that if a proposal is significantly related
to the issuer, although economically insignificant, it may not be
excluded from the issuer's proxy materials."' However, a potential
problem with the revision to this rule is that many issuers may
automatically request a no-action letter for any proposal that is deemed
economically insignificant. This will only further escalate the costs
of compliance with the shareholder proposal rule for issuers and
unnecessarily burden the Commission's staff.
Beyond this, Rule 14a-8(C)(5), if interpreted broadly by the staff,
will be inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. In Bellotti, the Supreme Court held that shareholders could decide, "through
the procedure of corporate democracy, whether their corporation
should engage in debate on public issues."0 7 The Bellotti case, in conjunction with the increasing visibility of corporate political activity,' 8
should make it more difficult for an issuer to successfully exclude a
proposal that does not have a significant relationship to the issuer's
business. ' " Instead, the revision of Rule 14a-8(C)(5) seems to disregard
Bellotti to the extent that the staff applies the "significantly related"
exclusion broadly.41
Exclusion of shareholder proposals that do not relate to five percent of the issuer's business pursuant to Rule 14a-8(C)(5) ignores the
practical realities of the size of many corporations.4

1'

A more

appropriate approach is to apply a stated percentage, for instance one
percent,412 on a sliding scale. In companies with relatively small earn-

ings, a proposal would have to affect at least one percent of the
406. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 509. "For example, the proponent could provide information that indicates that while a particular corporate policy which involves
an arguably insignificant portion of an issuer's business, the policy may have a significant impact on other segments of the issuers business or subject the issuer to significant
contingent liabilities." Id.
407. 435 U.S. at 795. See supra notes 116, 118-20 and accompanying text.
408. See supra note 403.
409. Propp, supra note 18, at 112.
410. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
411.
For example, Neuhauser noted that 5% of Exxon's 1981 revenues amounted
to $5,750,000,000, which was more revenue than all but 59 of the Fortune

500 companies. He observed that if such companies as Gulf & Western,
Deere, Honeywell or Alcoa were subsidaries of Exxon in 1981, they would
not be significant subsidaries for purposes of Rule 14a-8.
Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 65.
412. This figure was used before 1976 and was later removed in the 1976 amend-
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issuer's business in order to be included in the proxy statement.
However, in companies with extremely large earnings, a proposal
would only have to affect a markedly lower percentage of business
like one-tenth of a percent. This sliding scale economic test would
consider the extent of operations of larger companies and adjust the
percentage test accordingly. In this respect, those companies which
have the largest revenues would not be insulated from shareholder
proposals on important social and political issues relating to their
business.
Shareholder proposals that have great significance which
transcends their economic importance will not always be excluded
under Rule 14a-8(C)(5)." 3 This clause in the revised, provision should
theoretically serve as an adequate check on the issuers so that the
economic criterion does not overshadow the rest of the provision. Many
aspects of a proposal that fails to satisfy the economic test may be
sufficiently important to shareholders that their exclusion will impede
adequate disclosure. Therefore, it is imperative that the staff administer Rule 14a-8(C)(5) in such a way that the economic criterion
does not overshadow the rest of the exclusion.
J.

14a-8(C)(7): Ordinary Business

The interpretive change to Rule 14a-8(C)(7) adopted by the Coinmission is a positive attempt to eliminate the staffs previous practice which elevated form over substance." No longer must a
shareholder proposal be included in the issuer's proxy material solely
because it requests that a report be compiled for the shareholders. '
Under the present revision the staff will first look to the issues the
report addresses;3 6 if the report concerns only ordinary business, it
will be excluded from the issuer's proxy materials."'
To eliminate the staffs practice of elevating form over substance
in administering Rule 14a-8(C)(7), the Commission has adopted an
appropriate interpretive change.' 8 In the past, the staffs practice was
ments to Rule 14a-. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
413. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(5) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.

414. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 3.
415. Id. Previously, the staffs position was based on the premise that issuers do
not prepare and issue reports on specific matters to shareholders or form committees

to study particular aspects of its business as part of their ordinary business operations.
SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 510.

416.
417.
418.
ding to this
tion. Id.

Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 4.
Id.
Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 67. Among the commentators responissue there was near unanimous concurrence with the new interpretive posi-
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to include all proposals that requested a report to the shareholders
on some matter, without regard to the substantive issues addressed
in the report. This practice imposed additional costs on both
shareholders and issuers when the proposal addressed an issue solely
within the province of management.419 The staff believes that many
issuers do not compile such reports as a matter of ordinary business.4
However, this belief should never be the sole reason for requiring
inclusion of a shareholder's proposal. Instead, the staff should evaluate
a proposal on its merits without regard to the seemingly arbitrary
objective standards which have developed.'21
The staff's previous practice was to interpret the "ordinary
business" exclusion without considering the subject matter of the proposal. Frequently shareholders would address issues entirely within
the province of management and add a request for a report in order
to avoid the exclusionary impact of Rule 14a-8(C)(7).'I In this way the
shareholder proponent could effectively circumvent the "ordinary
business" exclusion. If an issuer sufficiently proves that such a report
is a matter of ordinary business, then the staff should not burden
the issuer and its shareholders with the costs of including such a proposal in the proxy materials. Therefore, a request for a report should
not be outcome determinative, but rather should be only one factor
for the staff to examine in deciding whether a proposal is excludable.
The staff must, ultimately, look to statutory and decisional law
of the issuer's domicile to determine whether a proposal should be
excluded." Still, the staff must realize that some proposals which
require a management decision may not be excludable under Rule
14a-8(C)(7); some requests for reports are anything but ordinary
business, and may concern activities that shareholders may regard
as important. 2 ' Equally important, very real benefits as well as
improved disclosure can result from having an issuer justify its present practices in a report. 25

419.
420.

Id.
Id. See supra note 415.

421. Black & Sparks, supranote 114, at 977. This would require the staff to consider in each instance whether the type of information sought by the shareholder proponent involved is a matter in which the shareholders, as opposed to the board of directors, have a legitimate decision-making interest. Id.
422. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 510.
423. However, state law precedent is rarely conclusive as to what is or is not ordinary business. SEC DOCKET, supra note 13, at 510.
424. Eisenberg, supra note 212, at 915.
425. Summa?,'y of Comments, supra note 19, at 67.
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K. 14a-8(C)(10): Mootness
To insure adequate disclosure to its shareholders, issuers should
be required to include shareholder proposals unless they are already
fully implemented. The present "mootness" standards" 6 adopted by
the Commission are imprecise and subjective."' Information regarding
the speed and extent of management's compliance with shareholder
suggestions is a valid shareholder concern.'28 To allow an issuer to
exclude shareholder proposals which are "substantially" complied with
leaves shareholders uninformed of many important corporate concerns.
The Commission has adopted a significant interpretive change
to Rule 14a-8(C)(10) in determining whether a proposal can be excluded
for mootness. However, the mootness provision's vague and subjective language" will cause many interpretive problems for the staff;
it simply lacks any objective guidelines for determining if a proposal
is "substantially implemented." While the language itself may not be
overinclusive, there is a danger that the staff's interpretation may
be. The result is that Rule 14a-8(C)(10), if interpreted broadly, will
unreasonably restrict corporate disclosure.
Issuers should not be allowed to partially implement a
shareholder's proposal in order to avoid including it in their proxy
materials. Specifically, the part of the proposal not implemented is
often the most crucial to the shareholders.' " The present revision permits the issuer to avoid confronting the shareholder's proposal by just
such a partial implementation of his proposal. In order to adequately
serve the disclosure function, the issuer should allow the shareholders
to be able to assess and vote on every proposal that is proper for
their consideration.
Under Rule 14a-8(C)(10) the standards for determining whether
a shareholder proposal can be excluded are too subjective for effective staff implementation. The shareholders will become an uninformed
constituency if this provision is interpreted broadly by the staff.
Management will be able to avoid undesired debate and disclosure
by partial implementation. An issuer should have to justify why a

426. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
427. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 67. Several commentators believe
the new interpretive standard would create greater interpretive difficulties and
unreasonably constrain disclosure to shareholders. I&
428. Id.
429. Rule 14a-8(C)(10) now permits the omission of proposals that are "substantially implemented by the issuer."
430. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 72.
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certain aspect of a proposal has not been fully implemented and how
it intends to rectify this in the future; such information may be
necessary for a shareholder to evaluate the performance of current
management. Therefore, the issuers should be required to include proposals regardless of their partial implementation and then indicate
in their management's statement which parts of the proposals are
already implemented.
L.

14a-8(C)(12): Repeat Proposals

The revisions to Rule 14a-8(C)(12) are both oppressive and
unjustified. The previous rule excluded proposals that were substantially the same as proposals submitted in previous years.4 3' In contrast, under the new revision, proposals that relate to substantially
the same subject matter as proposals submitted in prior years are
excludable.4n In addition, the minimum percentage tests for resubmission of proposals in subsequent years are increased." Collectively,
these revisions only serve to further alienate shareholders and
emasculate the shareholder proposal process.4'u
The provision of Rule 14a-8(C)(12) allowing proposals that are
"substantially the same subject matter" as proposals included in prior
years to be excluded, will create a host of interpretive problems. The
wording of a proposal is of considerable importance to shareholders,
particularly institutional investors.435 Therefore, because the votes of
these shareholders may turn on slight changes in the language of the
resolution, the Commission's determination not to allow shareholders
a full opportunity to modify their approach to any given subject is
unsound. If the overall thrust of a proposal changes from one year
to another, particularly when the modifications are responsive to
management's arguments concerning the shortcomings of the proposed
action, the staff should refrain from treating the modified proposal
as a repeat proposal. The revisions to Rule 14a-8(C)(12) are likely to
unduly burden the reasonable exercise of "fair corporate suffrage"
3
which Congress intended section 14(a) of the 1934 Act to promote.'
Loosely interpreted, this exclusion would mean that concerned
shareholders could raise subject matters as broad as nuclear power
431.

17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(12) (1983).

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(12) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 79.
Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 5, at 679.
Id. at 683. See supra notes 12, 39.
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or South Africa only once every five years." ' Therefore, the staff
should interpret Rule 14a-8(C)(12) in light of the goals of the
shareholder proposal process and the social context in which companies
operate. Insensitive enforcement by the staff of Rule 14a-8(C)(12) could
reduce much of the present effectiveness of the shareholder proposal
process.
Rule 14a-8(C)(12) fails to acknowledge that shareholder votes may
turn on the language of the proposal. ' 38 Essentially, the present revisions to Rule 14a-8(C)(12) present shareholders with an all-or-nothing
dilemma. If a shareholder votes against a proposal he*must realize
that he has also effectively voted against more favorable solutions
to the same issue; such an outcome does not benefit shareholders and
is inconsistent with the notion of "fair corporate suffrage."
In conjunction with the revision of the "substantially the same"
language, the Commission has further restricted "fair corporate
suffrage" by increasing the percentage tests for resubmission of proposals in subsequent years.4 " If a proposal is initially included in the
issuer's proxy material, it must gain a stated percentage of the votes
for inclusion in the proxy materials in subsequent years. "" However,
the importance of the shareholder proposal process exceeds mere
tabulation of a numerical vote. At the outset, it is extremely doubtful
whether progress may be defined mathematically. Quite simply, "[t]he
subject matter of the proposal process is competing ideas and popularity affords no useful or enduring denominators of a proposal's relative

437. Lydenberg, supra note 16, at 65.
438. The BA Investment Management Corp., a subsidiary of BankAmerica Corp.,

recently made the following comment to the Commission:
On many occasions we have considered proposals in which we agree with
the general purpose but disagree with the specifics. If other shareholders
reject a proposal for such a reason, the proponent may wish to reformulate

the proposal so as to make it more passable. The improved version of the
proposal may then be resubmitted to the shareholders the following year

and may very well receive more support. We feel that this is a constructive
process, one in which the most desirable form of proposal may be developed
and eventually passed by the shareholders.
Letter from Thomas H. Andrews, Senior Vice President, & Daphne M. O'Keefe, Corporate
Social Responsibility Analyst, BA Investment Management Corp., to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, dated Sept. 5, 1976 (File No. S7-643).

439. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. The failure of shareholder proposals to carry or win larger votes is no criterion to judge the validity of a proposal. Emer-

son & Latcham, supra note 361, at 835.
440.

17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C(12) (1984). Reprinted in appendix.
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or ultimate worth.""' In spite of these misgivings about the percentage tests for resubmission, the Commission has unnecessarily increased the stated percentage figures used in the test."2
Increasing the minimum percentage tests for resubmission for
shareholder proposals is unjustified given the realities of shareholder
voting. The small number of favorable votes most shareholder proposals receive is largely a function of management's recommendations
in the proxy materials for or against a specific proposal. " ' In addition, unmarked proxies " are a large factor affecting the results of
the shareholder vote. Management has discretion to vote these
unmarked proxies against the various shareholder proposals. Increasing the minimum percentage tests for resubmission also favors the
larger companies.4 '5
Under the revisions of Rule 14a-8(C)(12) that increase the
minimum percentage tests, larger companies with a substantial impact
on society are insulated from being accountable to their shareholders.
To prevent this problem, the minimum percentage tests should be
applied on a sliding scale to fairly reflect those areas of relative
importance. The revised minimum percentage tests fail to reveal
substantial shareholder interest because they do not consider absolute
numbers. The previous limits of three percent and six percent for
the first and second years respectively should continue to apply. " ,
Ten percent should be the upper limit for any years thereafter. These
figures, however, should be adjusted downward for companies with
a large shareholder body. "'
V.

CONCLUSION

The proxy rules governed by the Commission are principally
designed to assure proper disclosure. In furtherance of this goal, Rule
14a-8 permits direct participation by shareholders in the affairs of
441. Emerson & Latcham, supr&note 361, at 835.
442. Summary of Comments, supranote 19, at 78. It was argued that the abuses
of the existing rule have been rare and do not justify the revision proposed, that any abuse
can be dealt with under a stricter application of the present interpretation. Id443. STAFF REPORT, supro note 80, at 162.
444. These are proxies which are signed in blank and voted at management's discretion. Such proxies are a large factor affecting the results of voting on shareholder proposals.
445. STAFF REPORT, supra note 80, at 171.
446. See 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(C)(12) (1983).
447. Summary of Comments, supra note 19, at 171. For instance, companies
like Exxon with approximately 846 million investors should be treated differently than
appreciably smaller companies for purposes of Rule 14a-8(C)(12.
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every corporation whose proxy solicitation is subject to the Commission's proxy rules. In fact, there is probably no rule governed by the
Commission which offers more opportunity for practical application
to more individual shareholders. " 8 Throughout its forty-year history,
Rule 14a-8 has been perceived as an exemplar of "fair corporate suffrage." Nevertheless, some changes are necessary to insure that Rule
14a-8 continues to function effectively.
The current revisions to Rule 14a-8 are the Commission's
response to the perceived abuses by shareholders. Indeed, some of
the revisions adopted by the Commission maintain "fair corporate suffrage" while achieving the goals of the Proxy Review Program. On
the whole, however, the Commission has perceived the problem
incorrectly in some instances and overacted in others. The Commission has fashioned numerous formulae permitting issuers to decide
whether proposals may be omitted from corporate proxy materials
without reaching the merits of the proposal. Active use of the corporate proxy machinery does not, by itself, constitute abuse."9 In
addition, concerns about the cost of the shareholder proposal process
are greatly exaggerated.
The present revisions will have little or no positive effect on
the costs to issuers of compliance with Rule 14a-8. However, the present revisions will have a great negative impact on corporate
disclosure and the notion of "fair corporate suffrage." In the past,
the Commission has gone to great lengths to insure shareholder access
to the corporate proxy machinery. Whether such a commitment on
the Commission's part will persist in the future remains to be seen.
SEAN PATRICK O'BRIEN
448. Black & Sparks, supra note 30, at 1-2.
The proxy rules are very likely the most effective disclosure device in the
SEC scheme of things. The proxy literature, unlike application for registration and the statutory reports, gets into the hands of investors. Unlike the

Securities Act prospectus, it gets there in time. It is more readable than any
of these documents. And it gets to a good many people who never see a
prospectus ....

Loss, supra note 370, at 1027.

449. Release No. 34-20091, supra note 24, at 7.
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APPENDIX

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-20091 (Oct. 3,
1983) 48 Fed. Reg. 38218 (1983).
Text of Revised Rule 14a-8: § 240.14a-8 Proposals of security
holders.
(A) If any security holder of an issuer notifies the issuer of his
intention to present a proposal for action at a forthcoming meeting
of the issuer's security holders, the issuer shall set forth the proposal
in its proxy statement and identify it in its form of proxy and provide means by which security holders can make the specification required by Rule 14a-4(B) [17 CFR S 240.14a-4(B)]. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the issuer shall not be required to include the proposal in
its proxy statement or form of proxy unless the security holder
(hereinafter, the "proponent") has complied with the requirements of
this paragraph and paragraphs (B) and (C) of this section:
(1) Eligibility. (i) At the time he submits the proposal, the proponent shall be a record or beneficial owner of at least 1% or $1000
in market value of securities entitled to be voted at the meeting and
have held such securities for at least one year, and he shall continue
to own such securities through the date on which the meeting is held.
If the issuer requests documentary support for a proponent's claim
that he is the beneficial owner of at least $1000 in market value of
such voting securities of the issuer or that he has been a beneficial
owner of the securities for one or more years, the proponent shall
furnish appropriate documentation within 14 calendar days after
receiving the request. In the event the issuer includes the proponent's
proposal in its proxy soliciting material for the meeting and the proponent fails to comply with the requirement that he continuously hold
such securities through the meeting date, the issuer shall not be
required to include any proposals submitted by the proponent in its
proxy material for any meeting held in the following two calendar
years.
(ii) Proponents who deliver written proxy materials to holders
of more than 25 percent of a class of the issuer's outstanding securities
entitled to vote with respect to the same meeting of security holders
will be ineligible to use the provisions of Rule 14a-8 for the inclusion
of a proposal in the issuer's proxy materials. In the event the issuer
includes a proponent's proposal in its proxy material and the proponent thereafter delivers written proxy materials to the holders of more
than 25 percent of a class of the issuer's outstanding securities entitled
to vote with respect to such meeting, the issuer shall not be required
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to include any proposals submitted by that proponent in its proxy
soliciting materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar
years.
(2) Notice and Attendance at the Meeting. At the time he submits a proposal, a proponent shall provide the issuer in writing with
his name, address, the number of the issuer's voting securities-that
he holds of record or beneficially, the dates upon which he acquired
such securities, and documentary support for a claim of beneficial
ownership. A proposal may be presented at the meeting either by
the proponent or his representative who is qualified under state law
to present the proposal on the proponent's behalf at the meeting. In
the event that the proponent or his representative fails, without good
cause, to present the proposal for action at the meeting, the issuer
shall not be required to include any proposals submitted by the proponent in its proxy soliciting material for any meeting held in the
following two calendar years.
(3) Timeliness. The proponent shall submit his proposal sufficiently far in advance of the meeting so that it is received by the
issuer within the following time periods:
(i) Annual Meetings. A proposal to be presented at an annual
meeting shall be received at the issuer's principal executive offices
not less than 120 days in advance of the date of the issuer's proxy
statement released to security holders in connection with the previous
year's annual meeting of security holders, except that if no annual
meeting was held in the previous year or the date of the annual
meeting has been changed by more than 30 calendar days from the
date contemplated at the time of the previous year's proxy statement,
a proposal shall be received by the issuer a reasonable time before
the solicitation is made.
(ii) Other Meetings. A proposal to be presented at any meeting
other than an annual meeting specified in paragraph (A)(3)(i) of this
section shall be received a reasonable time before the solicitation is
made.
NOTE: In order to curtail controversy as to the date on which
a proposal was received by the issuer, it is suggested that proponents
submit their proposals by Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested.
(4) Number of Proposals. The proponent may submit no more
than one proposal and an accompanying supporting statement for
inclusion in the issuer's proxy materials for a meeting of security
holders. If the proponent submits more than one proposal, or if he
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fails to comply with the 500 word limit mentioned in paragraph (B)(1)
of this section, he shall be provided the opportunity to reduce the
items submitted by him to the limits required by this rule, within
14 calendar days of notification of such limitations by the issuer.
(B)(1) Supporting Statement. The issuer, at the request of the
proponent, shall include in its proxy statement a statement of the
proponent in support of the proposal, which statement shall not include
the name and address of the proponent. A proposal and its supporting statement in the aggregate shall not exceed 500 words. The supporting statement shall be furnished to the issuer at the time that
the proposal is furnished, and the issuer shall not be responsible for
such statement and the proposal to which it relates.
(B)(2) Identification of Proponent. The proxy statement shall also
include either the name and address of the proponent and the number
of shares of the voting security held by the proponent or a statement
that such information will be furnished by the issuer to any person,
orally or in writing as requested, promptly upon the receipt of any
oral or written request therefor.
(C) The issuer may omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from its proxy statement and form a proxy under any
of the following circumstances:
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile,
not a proper subject for action by security holders.
NOTE: Whether a proposal is a proper subject for action by security
holders will depend on the applicable state law. Under certain states'
laws, a proposal that mandates certain action by the issuer's board
of directors may not be a proper subject matter for shareholder action,
while a proposal recommending or requesting such action of the board
may be proper under such state laws.
(2) If the proposal, if implemented, would require the issuer to
violate any state law or federal law of the United States, or any law
of any foreign jurisdiction to which the issuer is subject, except that
this provision shall not apply with respect to any foreign law compliance with which would be violative of any state law or federal law
of the United States;
(3) If the proposal or the supporting statement is contrary to
any of the Commission's proxy rules and regulations, including Rule
14a-9 [17 CFR 5 240.14a-9], which prohibits false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;
(4) If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim
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or grievance against the issuer or any other person, or if it is designed
to result in a benefit to the proponent or to further a personal interest,
which benefit or interest is not shared with the other security holders
at large;
(5) If the proposal relates to operations which account for less
than 5 percent of the issuer's total assets at the end of its most recent
fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross
sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly
related to the issuer's business;
(6) If the proposal deals with a matter beyond the issuer's power
to effectuate;
(7) If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct
of the ordinary business operations of the issuer;
(8) If the proposal relates to an election to office;
(9) If the proposal is counter to a proposal to be submitted by
the issuer at the meeting;
(10) If the proposal has been rendered moot;
(11) If the proposal is substantially duplicative of a proposal
previously submitted to the issuer by another proponent, which proposal will be included in the issuer's proxy material for the meeting;
(12) If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject
matter as a prior proposal submitted to security holders in the issuer's
proxy statement and form of proxy relating to any annual or special
meeting of security holders held within the preceding five calendar
years, it may be omitted from the issuer's proxy materials relating
to any meeting of security holders held within three calendar years
after the latest such previous submission:
Provided, that;
i) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during
such preceding period, it received less than five percent of the total
number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(ii) If the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during
such preceding period, it received at the time of its second submission less than eight percent of the total number of votes cast in regard
thereto; or
(iii) If the prior proposal was submitted at three or more
meetings during such preceding period, it received at the time of its
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latest submission less than 10 percent of the total number of votes
cast in regard thereto; or
(13) If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock
dividends.
(D) Whenever the issuer asserts, for any reason, that a proposal
and any statement in support thereof received from a proponent may
properly be omitted from its proxy statement and form a proxy, it
shall file with the Commission, not later than 60 days prior to the
date the preliminary copies of the proxy statement and form of proxy
are filed pursuant to Rule 14a-6(A) [17 CFR § 240.14a-6(A)J, or such
shorter period prior to such date as the Commission or its staff may
permit, five copies of the following items: (1)the proposal; (2) any statement in support thereof as received from the proponent; (3) a statement of the reasons why the issuer deems such omission to be proper
in the particular case; and (4) where such reasons are based on matters of law, a supporting opinion of counsel. The issuer shall at the
same time, if it has not already done so, notify the proponent of its
intention to omit the proposal from its proxy statement and form of
proxy and shall forward to him a copy of the statement of reasons
why the issuer deems the omission of the proposal to be proper and
a copy of such supporting opinion of counsel.
(E) If the issuer intends to include in the proxy statement a
statement in opposition to a proposal received from a proponent, it
shall, not later than 10 calendar days prior to the date the preliminary
copies of the proxy statement and form of proxy are filed pursuant
to Rule 14a-3(a), or, in the event that the proposal must be revised
to be includable, not later than five calendar days after receipt by
the issuer of the revised proposal promptly forward to the proponent
a copy of the statement in opposition to the proposal.
In the event the proponent believes that the statement in
opposition contains materially false or misleading statements within
the meaning of Rule 14a-9 and the proponent wishes to bring this
matter to the attention of the Commission, the proponent promptly
should provide the staff with a letter setting forth the reasons for
this view and at the same time promptly provide the issuer with a
copy of such letter. [Sections 14(a), 49 Stat. 823 and 833; Sec. 20(a)
and 38(a), SY Stat. 822 and 841; 15 U.S.C. 78n(a); 78w(a), 791(e), 794(a),
800.20(a), 80a-37(a)]. By the Commission, Commissioner Longstreth
dissenting.
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